Genocide Prevention in the 21st Century: the Central African Republic by Weil, Claire
  
  
 
 
 
GENOCIDE PREVENTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
CLAIRE WEIL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
 
 
 
Presented to the Department of International Studies  
and the Robert D. Clark Honors College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor of Science 
 
June 2015 

 
 
iii  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Professor Martin, Professor Slovic and Professor Frank for 
helping me to fully examine the specific topic and consider the various perspectives and 
contexts related to this subject matter.  I am sincerely grateful for Professor Martin’s 
patience and guidance not only during the thesis process but throughout my past four 
years at the University of Oregon. His teachings have shifted my understanding of 
peace and have given me hope for the future. I would like to thank Professor Slovic for 
introducing me to a whole new way of considering the relationship between ethics and 
violence. I wish to also thank Professor Frank without whom I would not have had all 
the life changing learning opportunities here at the university. 
I believe that it would also be suitable for me to thank Professor Jennings who 
has taught me all that I know about international law and conflict in Africa. His 
valuable insight and expertise on the subject have been crucial for the success of this 
research.    
 
 
iv  
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
APB Atrocity Prevention Board 
APRD People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy 
ASF African Standby Force 
AU African Union 
CAR Central African Republic 
CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy 
CEWS Continental Early Warning System 
CPJP Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace 
DDR  Demobilization and reintegration programs 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EU European Union 
EUFOR RCA European operational force in the CAR 
EEAS European External Action Service 
FOMAC La Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale 
Genocide Convention Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
ICC International Criminal court 
INGO International Non-Governmental organization 
MISCA African-led International Support Mission to the Central 
African Republic 
MINUSCA Multidimensional Integrated UN mission for the stability in 
the CAR 
MSF Doctors Without Borders 
OAU Organization of African Unity 
PanWise Panel of the Wise 
PKO Peacekeeping operation 
PSC African Union Peace and Security Council 
REC Regional Economic Communities 
R2P Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
UDFU Union of Democratic Forces for Unity 
UN United Nations 
UN Charter Charter of the United Nations 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
 
  
 
 
v  
Table of Contents 
Introduction 1 
Facing Genocide 7 The word: genocide 7 Triggering Prevention Action: The Responsibility to Protect and the UN Charter Chapter VII 15 Additional Prevention Tools 20 The limitations of R2P 22 New Africa peace and security structures 27 
Crisis in the Central African Republic 36 Historical Background 36 Genocide in the Making 42 Classification, Discrimination Polarization: Decanting society’s different components 43 Symbolization and Organization- Visible separation 47 Genocide: Preparation, dehumanization, persecution and extermination 48 Importance of stability in the CAR 51 
Genocide Prevention: Application of Existent Tools 54 2013 AU and ECCAS: MISCA 54 2014 France and the EU: Opération Sangaris and EUFOR RCA 56 2015 UN: MINUSCA 63 
Enlarging Genocide Prevention: the political and the cultural 74 Genocide as a form of war: degenerate war 82 Economic dimension: scarce resources and decision-making 84 
Conclusion 95 
Recommendations: Shifting to a larger framework of genocide prevention using 
innovation and investment 97 
Further Research 100 
List of Figures 102 
Bibliography 104
  
  
Introduction 
 
The Central African Republic (CAR) crisis in 2014 was labeled by Global 
Humanitarian Assistance as the “worst crisis you’ve never heard of”. In early 2013, the 
peace deals of the Bush War in the CAR collapsed and with it, the whole country.  
Muslim rebel groups united under the Séléka fought viciously against the established 
government in order to take power. The Séléka adopted a strategy of extreme violence 
against civilians and, in response, the predominantly Christian group of self-organized 
Central Africans formed the Anti-Balaka. The latter retaliated with just as much 
violence and brutality. In a matter of months, the already weak and impoverished CAR 
disintegrated into chaos and anarchy. Political structures dissolved. The economy broke 
down. Civil services were no longer available. Millions were displaced and thousands 
were barbarically massacred in just a matter of months. All the conditions and factors 
that could cause genocide were met. However, full-scale genocide did not happen or has 
yet to take place in the CAR. Why? Is it possible that a series of intentional and regular 
interventions can effectively thwart modern day genocide?    
The 20th century is remembered as a period of incredible violence in particular 
because of the Holocaust and the coining of the term “genocide” which aims to reflect 
the most extreme type of violence. Raphael Lemkin dedicated his life to define this 
concept and have it recognized by the international system. The international 
community adopted the word and established structures, laws and tribunals that would 
carry out the international community’s commitment to never allow “the worst of the 
worst” to happen again. These efforts exemplified the global willingness to change the 
approach human society has towards extreme atrocities. Despite these admirable efforts, 
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genocide is still a reality of the 21st century. The need to discuss failures in preventing 
genocide is crucial in order to avoid the morbid mistakes of the past. Yet it is necessary 
also to analyze small victories and successes to replicate the techniques that have saved 
human lives and the integrity of humanity. The tools created and implemented by the 
international community have significant weaknesses but their powers and 
achievements often go unrecognized. Optimistic progress has been made in the domain 
of genocide prevention in particular during this past decade. Efforts to curtail genocide 
in the CAR deserve greater attention and recognition in the literature of genocide 
prevention.  
 
This study on genocide prevention in the Central African Republic (CAR) was 
undertaken to explore the advances of atrocity prevention in the 21st century and frame 
the analysis of genocide prevention in an active and positive manner. It will show how 
existent tools to prevent genocide can be effective, how the implementation of those 
tools is possible for constructive change and how a shift of framework in the 21st 
century can prevent genocide in the long-run. The management of the crisis in the CAR 
demonstrated the outstanding potential of existent legislation and systems to 
appropriately avert genocide. The story of the CAR may be considered a relative 
success. However, conflict is rarely resolved and more often transformed. 
Consequently, a part of this research project will also examine how innovation and a 
shift in conflict analysis framework can affect sustainable genocide prevention in the 
Central African region in the future. The goal of this thesis project is to demonstrate that 
tools created to trigger prevention and reaction to genocide have been effective in 
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particular in the CAR but that the frameworks through which the international 
community addresses genocide must be enlarged for the sustainability of the 
intervention. 
Existent literature critiques past situations of genocide using an ethical 
framework based on the model of the international state system. Francis Deng’s piece, 
Sovereignty As Responsibility, is a major contribution in this outlook on genocide 
prevention. Leo Kuper and Raphel Lemkin are other key figures that framed genocide 
in terms of ethics and human security in an international state system. Research 
evaluates tools of genocide prevention and highlights situations of failure such as the 
Holocaust, Rwanda, Cambodia and ex-Yugoslavia in hopes of ameliorating future 
interventions. However, academic writing reflecting on somewhat successful 
interventions in Africa such as the one in Burundi, Monrovia and even Kenya are rare 
(Lyman). Those who study these cases are often academics in the field of African 
studies and hardly ever those who are in genocide studies. Interdisciplinary analysis of 
genocide is relatively uncommon particularly in the field of history (Schaller). For this 
reason, this thesis project will take an interdisciplinary approach to the subject of 
genocide prevention.  
This thesis project aims to adopt a different outlook while analyzing the issues at 
hand in a more proactive and holistic way. The situation in the CAR must be considered 
in a regional context. Categorization however should go beyond that of states. The 
different demographic, social, political, economic and geographical layers are 
fundamental in this interdisciplinary research. The crisis is affected by regional and 
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even international political and institutional networks so it can be evaluated through this 
lens as well.   
The debate of whether or not the conflict in the CAR was on the verge of 
genocide will not be the focus of this research. It will be taken as a given but I will 
explain why it is considered so using Gregory Stanton’s “Ten Stages of Genocide” and 
the United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Prevention . My intent is to link 
different understandings of genocide prevention rather than discussing the semantics of 
concept of “genocide”. In addition to this, the project will exclude a discussion on 
justice and punishment as a means of prevention even though some may argue that 
criminal courts and international law play significant roles in doing so. The Rome 
Statue establishing the International Criminal Courts in 1998 will not be considered but 
may be referred to. According to Samantha Power in A Problem From Hell: America 
and The Age of Genocide, reconciliation, truth-telling and responding to a certain due 
are foundations for genocide prevention in the long run. I do recognize the ICC’s 
importance in preventing genocide by: incapacitating perpetrators, deterring future 
génocidaires, establishing historical records of the events and pinpointing individual 
responsibility (Power 481-491). However, it is not included in the scope of this study 
due to time constraints. This may be an aspect to be further developed in the future. 
Furthermore, this project will not delve into domestic politics and dynamics. In other 
words, for example, the immense work of the Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) in 
unlocking millions to fund and support the international initiative in the CAR will also 
be left out of this study. I fully recognize the power and importance of domestic 
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mechanisms that allow international intervention in the first place but, again, due to 
time constraints and the limited scope of this study, I will be leaving out this analysis.  
The essential limitation of this project remains the fact that conflict and 
instability are still ongoing in the CAR. Data collection on the ground and evaluation of 
the complexity of the conflict are not updated continuously and consistently. Access to 
specific information remains limited to foreign press and non-governmental 
organization reports which can only provide a partial understanding of the situation in 
the field. Quantitative data is very difficult to come by and varies significantly because 
of circumstances on the ground and poor governmental records. It is important to keep 
in mind that this thesis project will be attempting to somehow demonstrate a negative: 
non-intervention or ineffective intervention would have allowed the crisis in the CAR to 
worsen. The last limitation of this project is that Africa is not the focus of my studies 
and so my knowledge of the different moving parts that come into play in terms of 
politics, economics, history and geography of the CAR is finite and narrow.  
Having considered these limitations, the project will be divided into three parts: 
a historical background to genocide prevention, an examination of the effectiveness of 
international intervention in preventing further developments of genocide in the CAR 
and, finally, a reflection on different ways of framing genocide prevention in the 21st 
century. The first part will deconstruct the concept of genocide in the current system. It 
will look at how the term came about and what types of legislations and structures were 
created to handle the worst actions of humanity. This part of the project will also 
highlight the implications of legal, political and military structures in terms of how they 
may be powerful tools to resolve conflict or not. The second part will provide a 
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thorough understanding of the crisis in the CAR. It underlines the causes and 
proceedings of the genocide and highlight the intervention’s victories and its key 
players.  
In the final part of this study, the long term consequences these prevention 
operations will be extrapolated and put into a different perspective. Here, the impact of 
genocide prevention will be enlarged and linked to the life of the Central Africans 
beyond the end of mass atrocities. Through showing that genocide prevention in the 
CAR has been effective, this research highlights the importance of continuously 
adapting our methods of prevention to create durable visions of peace. Genocide 
prevention must go beyond a framework based on ethics and the international state 
system. Understanding genocide prevention from a historical, political and cultural lens 
is crucial for the long-run. 
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Facing Genocide 
The word: genocide 
After 1945, there seemed to be no easy way for the world to deal with the 
trauma of the Holocaust. The horrors were indigestible and so exorbitantly terrible that 
people simply could not to comprehend or effectively respond to it. Raphael Lemkin, a 
Polish Jew lawyer who had been severely affected by the events of not only the 
Holocaust but also in general the extermination of people and culture in history, took it 
upon himself to rectify the system that allowed such atrocities to happen. He saw a 
severe inadequacy in the international system concerning the management of this 
magnitude of crisis. He decided that it was crucial to codify and officially 
institutionalize a way to combat incomprehensible extreme violence and crime. The 
“rules of war” such as The Hague Conventions (1899, 1907) and The Geneva 
Conventions (1949) were unsatisfactory and could not cover a significant legal gap 
because of their exclusivity to official periods of war. Even during times of war, these 
treaties did not seem sufficient to prevent barbarity relative to the Nazi extermination of 
Jews (Power 21).  Lemkin found it senseless that certain Nazi crimes committed before 
the declaration of war, such as the events in Poland, would never be accounted for. He 
wrote in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Law of Occupation, that it was necessary to 
touch on the preservation and the integrity of people not just human lives killed and 
lost; he refers to something physical and cultural about human existence that must be 
safeguarded (Lemkin 90). “Because groups are social constructions, they can neither be 
constituted nor destroyed simply through the bodies of their individual members. 
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Destroying groups must involve a lot more than simply killing, although killing and 
other physical harm are rightly considered important to it” (Shaw, “Sociology and 
Genocide,” 161). As a young lawyer, he concluded that only the creation of a new legal 
instrument, a sort of universal jurisdiction, would be able to fill the gap of this absurdity 
that seemed to continuously grow with the advent of modern machinery and weapons. 
Law was the only means to fight back for the weaponless and voiceless victims of such 
atrocities. In order to do so, he felt the need to invent a word that would embody the 
weight of horrors such as the Holocaust not limited to number of deaths: one that would 
hold accountable perpetrators such as the Nazis for their acts and intents but also 
bystanders such as the Allies, who knowingly let the process take place.   
Lemkin ultimately settled for the word “genocide”, a Greek Latin derivative that 
means “race killing”. After years of hard work, his persistent lobbying and dedication to 
the cause finally transformed his post-Nuremberg trial United Nations (UN) resolution 
into a hefty convention that frames our approach to the worst crime of all (Power 54-
60).  The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, also 
known as the Genocide Convention, that was ratified in December 1948 and put in 
place in January 1951, established that genocide would be a crime in times of war and 
peace. It would transcend time and spatial borders unlike the crimes against humanity 
equated with genocide during the Nuremberg trials in 1945 and 1946. Genocide as a 
unique concept would become a universal responsibility and accountability for human 
beings at their worst. Genocide would come to be defined as:  
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
a) Killing members of a group 
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b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part 
d) Imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group 
The following acts shall be punishable:  
a) Genocide 
b) Conspiracy to commit genocide 
c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide 
d) Attempt to commit genocide 
e) Complicity in genocide (UN General Assembly, Genocide 
Convention) 
Lemkin’s law was a historical development and a vital advancement in international 
human rights. This moral code was finally set on paper and sealed by international 
agreement. Despite the fact that it was not ratified or signed by all member countries of 
the UN, it is recognized as international customary law (Schabas 131). In other words, it 
truly is an attempt at universal law, the way Lemkin had hoped it would be. Over 75% 
of international states member of the UN ratified it and adhere to its principles. The 
Genocide Convention can be taken as an international norm that will be applied 
universally even though some have not officially signed it as treaty law. The advisory 
opinion of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the Genocide Convention states 
that, similarly to the rules on the treatment of prisoners of war or the status of 
diplomatic immunity, “the first consequence arising from this conception [of genocide] 
is that the principles underlying the convention as principles […] are recognized by 
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation” 
(Schabas 132). Consequently, even though countries like the CAR are not party to the 
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Genocide Convention, they are still subject to the conditions of the convention and must 
abide by those rules as a state and as citizens of the state.  
 The Genocide Convention has many revolutionary aspects that have become for 
the international community common ground on which to construct a plan of action in 
preventing genocides such as the ones in the CAR in the 21st century.  The phrase 
“intent to destroy in whole or in part” sets a solid and realistic framework for genocide. 
This part of the definition solved a contentious quantitative disagreement between the 
states of the General Assembly. There was no consensus on the number of victims 
which would qualify a certain genocidal situation. With this phrase, the death of a few 
thousand in the CAR therefore will be valued at the same level as the millions of Jews 
that died in Europe. The Séléka génocidaires in the CAR targeted the Christian 
population while they never assumed the elimination of all Christians, they may still be 
accused, punished and accountable for acts of genocide. Similarly, the Bosnian Serbs 
never thought to eliminate all Muslims on earth but instead intended to annihilate 
principally Bosnian Muslim men. The result is that after the war, many Bosnian Muslim 
women found themselves incapable of having a family. This is what Lemkin would 
have pointed out as “cultural” genocide: the extermination of a people, its culture and 
its ability to carry on (Lemkin 79). Despite the fact that the definition does not mention 
extreme political or cultural violent repression as genocide, the “intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part” creates an opening framing genocide as political or cultural.  
 The definition’s emphasis is also on intent: on an active willingness and ultimate 
aim to commit the crime. Consciousness of the implications and goals of a specific act 
of genocide is as important as actually committing it. If the international community 
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had to wait until millions were massacred and stripped of their essential human dignity 
in order to call the occurrences genocide, there would be no such thing as genocide 
prevention. France and the African Union would have had to wait until a quarter of the 
Central African population was chopped into pieces festering in the fields before 
actually intervening to stop the ravage of the mercenaries. However central it may be to 
the definition of genocide, “intent” is also a delicate and controversial aspect of the 
definition. How should one measure or demonstrate intent of an individual or a state? 
There is no straightforward method of measuring the truthfulness of intent. It is argued 
that the genocidal intent of Muammar Gaddafi expressed in his murderous words to his 
brother during the 2011 Libyan crisis were “overvalued” and that foreign intervention to 
protect civilians only created space for the ongoing civil war rather than preventing 
genocide (Mbeki). Intent of a person is considered by the definition within a system. In 
other words, the intent must be part of a plan. Although it cannot be quantified or 
proven, it is still central to prevention. An individual or a state would be convicted of 
the crime of genocide through a notion of joint criminal enterprise: they are liable for 
their conscious decisions and their intended or unintended consequences within the 
larger targeted strategy of destruction and violence.  
 The concept of genocide is not only ingenious in its framework but also refined 
in its content. Genocide affecting members of a “group” refers to the fact that 
perpetrators define the individual’s victim status (Schabas 133). The “othering” of 
certain members in society, stages of polarization and dehumanization in Gregory 
Stanton’s “The Ten Stages of Genocide”, defines genocide and the intent of perpetrators 
(Stanton, “Ten Stages”). Certain individuals will be treated as members of a group 
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whether they identify with it or not. Many Jews in Nazi Germany never thought of 
themselves as Jewish but instead identified maybe as French, German or Polish. This 
did not change the Jewish identity, status and image that were inflicted upon them. For 
the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka in the CAR, those who were drawn into the violence 
often did not identify with one group or another. They were simply qualified as such 
arbitrarily. Genocide, as defined by the Genocide Convention, highlights this particular 
nuance and also creates a new nominal space in international law that furthermore 
differentiates it from other crimes such as ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.    
 The term genocide aims to exemplify the weight of destruction that no other 
word could encompass. Crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing that 
are often crimes categorized with genocide today did not cover the extent that Lemkin 
wished them to. Lemkin in his own writing envisioned genocide in two phases: “one, 
destruction of national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the 
national pattern of the oppressor.” (Lemkin 79) Only one of those aforementioned 
crimes included crimes committed in times of peace and none of them were inclusive 
enough to incorporate various methods of perpetrating crimes. Lemkin’s term 
understood crimes as not only physical but also political, social, cultural, economic, 
biological, religious and moral (Lemkin 79). The definition provided by the convention 
carves out a unique space for the concept of genocide in the legal world of human 
rights. Genocide differs from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes 
and can even be considered as an overarching notion. It is a broader than ethnic 
cleansing since it includes additionally racial, religious and national identification. 
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Genocide is also more extensive than crimes against humanity and war crimes because 
these are only committed in times of war. Moreover, genocide is paradoxically a 
narrower concept since it is specific to a population or group whereas crimes against 
humanity and war crimes are indiscriminate.  By standardizing genocide, Lemkin was 
able to cover a legal gap that was so problematic and incapacitating in protecting human 
lives.   
In spite of this success, the term genocide has proven to be a conundrum time 
and again since its creation. Criticisms are often directed at the inadequacy of the term 
to actually and concretely represent what it was intended to represent. Political and 
cultural genocide are omitted in the definition which weakens the power of the term. 
This is in part due to the reluctance of states to put themselves in a difficult position in 
domestic politics. If the political aspect of genocide were to be included in its definition, 
then the US would have had to reevaluate its responsibility to its Native American 
populations and the USSR would have had to answer to those who died and suffered in 
the gulags. Additionally, many states simply could not fathom how cultural genocide 
would have any comparative meaning or consequences. Schabas gives the example 
where states could not see how the closing of libraries would equate with the 
extermination of Jews in the concentration camps (Schabas 135). The reality was, 
however, that the imperial and colonial nations would have had to reconsider the 
treatment of their colonies and the oppression and suppression of culture there. In 
addition to this, purposeful population displacement due to conflict was also ignored as 
an act of genocide. This disqualifies certain severely problematic situations from being 
called genocide. Most recent examples of this would include demographic changes 
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resulting from the conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan as well as in the CAR where over 
a fourth of the population now is unable to go home and must live in dire conditions far 
from their livelihoods (UNHCR News, “Central African Republic,” 2015). 
Displacement as such would be categorized as ethnic cleansing and not genocide. I will 
argue in this study that the inclusion of a political and cultural understanding of 
genocide is essential for effective genocide prevention in the long run. This shortfall in 
the definition is what needs to be overcome in a new approach to genocide prevention 
for eventual sustainable peace.  
What additionally complicates the notion of genocide is the fact that it remains 
founded in a system of international states. Countries, after agreeing to the Genocide 
Convention, must incorporate it into national laws. Therefore, the concept of genocide 
is somewhat tainted by the interpretation of the states themselves and remains tailored 
to each country rather than being an uncontested universal concept. In a world where 
the highest international authority remains states themselves, the belief that states would 
hold themselves responsible for crimes committed against their own people is very 
optimistic. The fragility of this condition makes the implementation of the Genocide 
Convention quite challenging. Although this may have been a naïve and hopeful move 
on Lemkin’s part, this problem is inherently a shortcoming of the UN in general.  
The defining of certain crimes as genocide remains an incredible international 
and personal feat for Lemkin. This first step forward has expanded the human 
understanding of violence and has set a higher standard of international ethics and 
morality. Lemkin created a legal framework so that “genocide is, first and foremost, a 
legal concept” (Schabas 123). As a result, the international community has been able to 
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prosecute Bosnian Serb personalities during the Yugoslavia trials and prosecute the 
state during the Rwandan trials through the International Criminal Tribunal. By doing 
so, genocide is formalized and the Genocide Convention becomes a powerful legal 
instrument. 
Triggering Prevention Action: The Responsibility to Protect and the UN Charter 
Chapter VII 
Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the UN has expanded its 
peacekeeping role to adapt to changes in patterns of conflict. There are more intra-state 
wars and fewer US-USSR proxy wars such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War 
(“History of Peacekeeping”). With the UN Security Council (SC) unlocked, the UN can 
more easily engage in military action without a risk of nuclear Armageddon. With many 
other organizational reforms, the UN has increased the UNSC’s duties and its numbers 
of missions (“History of Peacekeeping”). The UN’s role now includes now a new 
function of humanitarianism and interventionism centered of the emerging human rights 
discourse of the late 20th century. This increasing humanitarian interventionism is also 
possible due to the change in the concept of sovereignty. “Sovereignty” is a basic notion 
of the international state system that is a legacy of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. A 
sovereign state is one that has the unique authority to manage the liable people in its 
legitimate territory. Sovereignty implies that others do not have the right, legitimacy nor 
power to interfere with another’s sphere of influence and impact its territorial integrity. 
However, the Cambodian, the Rwandan and the Bosnian genocide accentuated the fact 
that, at times, states themselves are no longer able or willing to protect the citizens who 
confer sovereignty in the first place. In these cases, because certain human beings no 
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longer have state protection to guarantee their basic human rights and needs, the 
international community is the only possible guarantor of these rights. The state itself 
then is no longer sovereign and cannot protect its people from four main crimes: 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The Responsibility 
to Protect doctrine (R2P), and The Charter of the United Nations (also known as the UN 
Charter) when combined, aim to overcome this problem.  
R2P is an innovative tool and norm that reinforces the UN Charter in preventing 
genocide in the 21st century. Former UN special advisor, Edward Luck, in his video on 
the emergence of R2P, explains that the Responsibility to Protect was inspired by the 
change of an African approach to conflict resolution (“Special Adviser Edward Luck on 
R2P”). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African 
Union (AU) in the early 2000s went from a policy of non-interference in state internal 
affairs to a policy of non-indifference particularly concerning the development of 
conflict. This initiative truly embodies values of the new century focused on human 
security away from national security. International discussions on the prevention of 
conflict and the fostering of peace incorporate an awareness of gendered violence, a 
reflection on civilian status in conflict, and a more global approach to upholding human 
dignity and humanity (“Special Adviser Edward Luck on R2P”). The 2005 World 
Summit formalized R2P as an international doctrine and norm. This process cemented 
the idea that sovereign states are responsible towards their populations and the 
cultivation of peace internationally. The international community has a duty to prevent 
and stop genocide when states themselves do not do so. Sovereignty consequently “no 
longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of 
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responsibility that holds States accountable for the welfare of their people.” (“Special 
Adviser Edward Luck on R2P”) Thus, sovereignty is “reconceptualized” (Mepham & 
Ramsbotham 5) in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention which establishes “sovereignty 
as responsibility”.  
R2P is outlined by three pillars and three responsibilities. The first pillar 
declares that states are responsible for their populations including non-citizens. will 
address the basic needs and rights of their populations. They will not execute genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing. The second pillar of R2P 
affirms that the international community is responsible for state responsibility by 
providing help in terms of support assistance and capacity building. This pillar focuses 
on international interconnectivity and interdependence: national security is inseparable 
from human security. The last pillar explains that in the case where states are no longer 
responsible, the international community will take over that responsibility in a timely 
decisive way and use the appropriate means to protect populations (UN General 
Assembly, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”). These pillars take shape in 
three responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild. Prevention 
implies that states and the international community that these belong to must actively 
seek to address the causes of the crimes covered by the doctrine – genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Reaction obliges those affected by 
aforementioned crimes to respond to the circumstances of atrocities with all adequate 
means possible whether they are military or not. Reconstruction entails that all must be 
concerned with not only the prevention of such crimes but also the restoration and long-
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term development of peace in afflicted areas. R2P is in principle constructed this way. 
However, for it to take shape, more concrete steps need to be taken.  
In the 2009 Report of the Secretary General on Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect, Ban Ki-Moon highlighted other necessary conditions for the success and the 
effectiveness of this doctrine. States must first of all comply and observe international 
human rights laws and agreements. Furthermore, R2P can only be effective if it moves 
beyond politics at the state level. Ban Ki-Moon stressed the importance of incorporating 
its principles into all cultures and at all different levels. States must also continuously 
self-reflect and assess their progress in adhering to these international ethical norms. 
State-to-state learning and region-to-region learning is highly encouraged in 
conjunction with research and development initiatives directed at sustaining peace.  
The application of the doctrine is made feasible by the UN Charter. Saving 
“succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (United Nations) is possible when 
R2P and Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter are observed together. Chapter VI calls 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes. When mediation, negotiation and judicial 
settlements and such are insufficient or ineffective, Chapter VII concerning action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression is vital for the 
enactment of R2P. Different articles of the Charter create steps to achieve the goals 
established in R2P that the international community has set for itself. Article 42 of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter explicitly states that 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41[on pacific means to stop threats and breaches of peace] would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include 
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demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of Members of the United Nations. (United Nations) 
Article 44 later on further emphasizes the possibilities of the use of force in order to 
stop genocide:  
When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling 
upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in 
fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that 
Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the 
Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that 
Member's armed forces. (United Nations) 
Supporters of the R2P doctrine hope to eventually incorporate the values of non-
indifference in people’s individual expectations of the international community. R2P is 
not a new legal obligation. It only reinforces existing legal obligations of states in 
accordance with the UN Charter and the Genocide Convention (UN General Assembly, 
“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”). Chapter VII again reminds the world of 
this changing notion of sovereignty. Human rights violations and breaches of 
humanitarian international law are substantial threats to international peace. Chapter VII 
in addition to Chapter VI shows that the UNSC will take matters of peace and security 
seriously because sovereignty is the responsibility to protect (Hankel 590).  
 The UNSC is the decision-making power and the ultimate authority on the 
responsibility to protect. This is problematic. Some argue that decisions may be 
politically biased. UNSC choices are closely intertwined with the national interests of 
the permanent five and thus, some seem not based in the need to safeguard universal 
values of peace and security. The veto power of the permanent members is infamous for 
its counter productivity at very crucial moments in history. However, without the 
UNSC, R2P is impotent. The executive power of the UNSC is what makes R2P and 
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international intervention technically possible. To try and overcome the problem 
concerning the UNSC’s ineffectiveness, an international code of conduct was agreed 
upon by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China and Russia:  
The most important point in this code of conduct was that none of the 
permanent members would be allowed to adopt an anti-humanitarian 
position in a situation that directly involved the self-conception of 
humanity. […] the use of the veto should not be admissible in this case. 
An exception would only be made […] for cases in which a Permanent 
Member would see its own vital concerns as coming under threat if it 
refrained from using the veto (Hankel 594).  
Although this code of conduct is not sturdy, it is a clause that may keep the UNSC 
accountable to its mission and role in crime prevention. Its unique authoritative power 
executes the ideals of the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions.  
 Additional Prevention Tools 
Additional tools have been put in place by the international community at the 
turn of the century to truly try and avoid the repetition of genocide. In support of R2P 
and the Genocide Convention, a five point plan enables concrete action of R2P. This 
plan addresses: preventing armed conflict, protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
ending impunity, early and clear warning, swift and decisive action. Furthermore, UN 
research projects launched after R2P have led to annual reports tracking its 
developments as well as how to better its application (“Tag Archives: UN 
Peacekeeping”). The creation of a Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes is one of 
the more significant achievements of this continuous research. This framework 
document indicates tangible tools for prevention by creating a realistic checklist for 
genocide prevention. These tools will be highlighted later on in this study’s analysis of 
genocide prevention in the CAR. Along with these plans, physical institutions have 
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been formed to address the plan actions. The establishment of the International Criminal 
Courts (ICC) through the Rome Statute of 1998 is the most prominent example. The 
ICC institutionalizes genocide and international crime prevention in the framework of 
justice. The court supports the process of genocide prevention through the effect of 
deterrence and by addressing long-run impunity. Although the study of this paper does 
not delve deeper in the role of the international judicial branch in preventing genocide, 
it is important to note its abilities but also its limited jurisdiction and the issues 
surrounding the legality and legitimacy of its rulings or judgments. Institutions are 
fundamental tools for preventing the worst atrocities. However, the role of personalities 
must not be underestimated. Coordinating genocide prevention and leading initiatives 
relies heavily on individual efforts. The Special Advisor to the Prevention on Genocide 
is in charge of early warning mechanisms and organizing information. This special 
advisor is the point of referral for the international community. Along with the special 
advisor, the Commission on Human Rights has created a position for an Independent 
Expert on Minority Issues.  
These tools put in place since the tragedies of the 20th century have outlined the 
international community’s common understanding of ethics and responsibility as well 
as its commitment to those standards for global peace and security. The dissolution of a 
bipolar system of power after the Cold War has made it possible for the international 
community to align its goals and missions. The formation of different plans, legal 
documents and institutions that embody the new values and norms focused on humanity 
and its security are indispensable. International agreements through the UN have made 
conflict prevention and management clearer, legitimate and useful. The international 
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community has learned from past experiences. Lessons learned were meticulously 
documented and incorporated into current research and action plans. Controversies and 
debates are ongoing but are slowly clarified. The role of states in the protection of 
civilians is defined. Responsibility to protect is formalized. The increasing number of 
reports and reflections on R2P show that a nuanced approach to international 
humanitarian intervention is important and inevitable for effective genocide prevention. 
The limitations of R2P 
Despite its conceptual success, R2P has significant imperfections that should be 
considered in the framework of this study. The fragility of the doctrine intrinsically lies, 
similarly to the Genocide Conventions, on the fact that all effective action hinges on the 
willingness of states to meet their responsibilities. There is no supranational authority to 
impose sanctions or create any kind of incentive for states to act according to their 
international agreements. States have no obligation to stay accountable or responsible. 
International intervention and effective genocide prevention is not applied consistently 
and coherently. “The sombre reality is that there remains a large gap between the 
principles endorsed by the world’s governments at UN conferences and in UN 
resolutions and their willingness to take action to uphold these principles in real-life 
cases” (Mepham & Ramsbotham 8). Sovereignty remains a significant impediment to 
international collaboration for peace and security.  
R2P can also be considered in relation to Saint Augustine’s Just War theory so it 
has inherently nothing to do with intervention (Hamilton 292). R2P can be considered 
as realpolitik decorated in the language of human rights. In this sense, it has no ethical 
basis at all. According to the Just War Theory, war must only be waged in the name and 
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the goal of peace. Conditions for military intervention according to the ICIS on R2P 
include: just cause, right intention, proportional means, violence as last resort, 
reasonable prospects of winning and the right authority (“The Responsibility to 
Protect”). In light of these criteria, qualifying R2P as an alternative Just War Theory 
may seem reasonable yet this view disregards R2P as a norm that goes beyond the use 
of violence and aggressive means. R2P embodies all types of preventive actions 
including but not limited to negotiations, mediation, institution building and 
administrative and military training. However weak this argument may be, the issue of 
military intervention for the responsibility to protect and for a just humanitarian cause is 
problematic for the effectiveness of R2P.  
R2P is risky in the sense that it may lead to unintended harmful consequences in 
international intervention. Damaging results may be unintentional but they may also be 
due to irresponsible and careless decision-making. Even though humanitarian missions 
are based on good intentions and a need to protect populations, intervention can be at 
times extremely detrimental if they are not well designed. One of the most notorious 
and painful examples would be the Somalia mission undertaken during the Clinton 
presidency. More recent examples specific to R2P include: the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and intervention during the Libyan crisis of 2011. Some 
such as Mbeki and Mamdani argue that this system creates possibilities of neo-
imperialism. Post-colonial states fear that the core principle of self-determination is 
undermined by R2P because it is a reformulation of “the right to intervene” and an eerie 
reminder of the “white man’s burden”: “They worry that a duty to intervene would 
grant a license for the great powers to interfere in their domestic affairs, undermining 
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their right to self-government” (Hankel 607). Mwansali, in his work on the African 
Union and the UN, recalls:  
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, whose views resonated with 
many members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 plus 
China, cautioned the 2005 World Summit: Concepts such as 
'humanitarian intervention' or 'responsibility to protect' need careful 
scrutiny in order to test the motives of their proponents. ... We need to 
avoid situations where [a] few countries, by virtue of their privileged 
positions, dictate the agenda for everybody else. We have witnessed 
instances where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of small and 
weak countries have been violated by the mighty and powerful, in 
defiance of agreed rules of procedures and the provision of the United 
Nations Charter (Mwansali 393). 
The “right to intervene” is another difficult issue on top of addressing issues on how, 
when and where to intervene. The pattern of Global North countries intervening in 
countries of the Global South is understandable but it still highlights an interesting 
phenomenon of the international system. Israel Daily recently published a satirical 
article titled “Middle Eastern States Debate Whether to Intervene in Baltimore” 
(Pumper). The absurdity and the comedic relief of this short article are due to the fact 
that intervention in Baltimore is unnecessary and inapplicable to the R2P and UN 
Charter framework1. Yet this title is still revealing of a certain mindset on intervention 
and the responsibility to protection. Assuming that a majority of African Americans are 
denied their fundamental rights and needs as citizens of the US and as a substantial 
minority subject to genocide, would the Middle Eastern states be liable to call for 
intervention? Could they point to the responsibility of the US to protect its citizens from 
police brutality and judicial bias? Realistically, would any action come out of this 
initiative? This article is a reminder that creating opportunities for co-operation based                                                         1 Although I acknowledge that this can be debated at length.  
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on respect for sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity is crucial for the legitimacy 
of R2P. This condition is particularly important out of respect for less vocal states that 
cannot have decision-making power in the UNSC. R2P norms must be carried by 
collective action in which regional states concerned with the intervention are at the 
forefront of the decision-making process and throughout the duration of the operations.  
The most relevant criticism of R2P is that operational capacity is a prerequisite 
for its implementation. The lack of financial, institutional and or military support for 
operational capacity makes peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations ineffective and 
sometimes detrimental. Even if operational capacities were available, these are limited 
by a complete reliance on the UNSC as the only authority able to deliver command of 
humanitarian intervention (Hamilton 293). This considerable limit of R2P’s capacity 
can be illustrated by the current lack of response in Darfur. The international 
community has been unable to handle this tragedy because of numerous reasons 
including the lack of operational capacity. A somewhat successful illustration of R2P 
would be its implicit use the case of the CAR. Rebecca Hamilton summarizes the main 
problems of R2P: lack of political will, lack of operational capacity, lack of 
authorization (Hamilton 296). R2P needs to be thought about in the larger context of 
UN bureaucratic reforms including the use and reach of the UNSC.  
More specifically, R2P also has some problems respective to intervention on the 
African continent. R2P in Africa is somewhat constrained because of the lack of 
resources, the lack of experience and the differences in historical cultural organization. 
R2P presupposes an established international framework that is not always applicable 
on the African continent (as well as in many non-Western countries). Due to the fact 
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that “in the case of many African states, without effective control over the entirety of 
their territories and with their legitimacy challenged among significant elements of their 
populations, sovereignty is more legal fiction than practical reality” (Puley 3). The 
expectation that states are responsible in this context is rather difficult. Even supposing 
that states are sovereign and responsible, the lack of well-established institutions and 
the lack of resources make it troublesome for African states to implement change 
throughout their countries homogenously. The financial deficiency and the little 
expertise only reinforce how problematic R2P can be in practice. Military intervention 
and regional action are tedious and strenuous. The result is that “when they have 
occurred, interventions for human protection purposes in Africa have also been plagued 
by a series of more practical problems. The time-consuming complexities of mandating 
and organizing a complex mission have often meant that help has arrived too late” 
(Puley 3). Because the continent has little independent means, the African Union (AU) 
must hold initiatives and duties on its own which is an unrealistic expectation (Powell & 
Barany). When the UN cannot act and or cannot act fast enough, the AU is expected to 
take the lead as the regional operating authority even though it is not prepared to do so. 
For example, the Darfur crisis was relegated to the AU despite the fact that it did not 
have the means to uphold any sort of substantial mission in Sudan. This problem again 
points to the fact that the current model of fostering peace and resolving conflict rarely 
takes into account different structures and cultures that outside the framework of nation 
states and a hierarchical order of power. The AU has taken significant steps to 
overcome these difficulties. The African Peace Fund and the African Standby Force 
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(ASF) are examples of some attempts to remediate these problems but they are only in 
their initial phase and are still too weak to demonstrate effective influence.  
Despite the numerous critiques of R2P, its impact has been significant. “Many 
scholars view the R2P framework as the most comprehensive approach to humanitarian 
intervention ever proposed” (Hamilton 292). Investment in R2P and its development is 
admirable and historical.  It is fundamental in creating an adequate guide to 
humanitarian intervention and genocide prevention.  
New Africa peace and security structures 
Specific structures for genocide prevention have also been set up on the African 
continent. Close to 50% of intra war conflict in world today is in Africa. These conflicts 
have created approximately 3 million refugees and 20 million displaced. There have 
been 186 coups since decolonization; 50% 0f which happened in the 80s and 90s (Puley 
2). Africa of the 21st century has chosen to adopt a new strategy of peace and security 
in order to mark a significant break with its past overwhelmed by conflict and genocide. 
Without peace, prospects of development and global integration of the continent is 
impossible. In line with this goal, the AU has set up numerous norms and principles that 
match the R2P UN doctrine. 
The AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 demonstrates the transition from the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) by creating a strong foundation for African 
continental cooperation for stability, peace and development. This desire for “non-
indifference” stemmed from the failure of the OAU to be proactive during the many 
massacres of the 20th century that devastated the continent:  
 
 
28  
The decision by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
OAU who adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union to 
incorporate the right of intervention in that Act stemmed from concern 
about the OAU’s failure to intervene in order to stop the gross and 
massive human rights violations witnessed in Africa in the past, such as 
the excesses of Idi Amin in Uganda and Bokassa in the Central African 
Republic in the 1970s and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Kioko 182).  
In the Constitutive Act, different articles such as Article 4 reiterate the dedication to 
upholding human life and the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law. The AU Constitutive Act “converged to create a new consensus in Africa and 
elsewhere. The treaties, norms, and principles entered into at the international level now 
often found real substance in the legal and constitutional norms and judicial practices 
enacted at the national level” (Mwansali 391). The Constitutive Act also goes so far as 
to legitimize intervention in member states for “grave circumstances” (Aning & Atuobi 
91). If peaceful means of resolving conflict and or preventing genocide are inefficient, 
the AU members agree to the principle in Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act: “The 
right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.” Responsibility to care for neighboring states in danger becomes 
solidified in the AU Constitutive Act signed by 54 states before it even is established by 
the UN. This radical take on peace and security characterizes Mwansali calls a 
“normative revolution” (Mwansali 390). The AU takes a definitive stance at the turn of 
the century. In order to ensure the functioning and the possibility of R2P and Article 4 
(h) of the Constitutive Act, collaboration between the UN at the international level, the 
AU at the continental level and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) at the 
regional level are indispensable. The AU has invested a significant amount of effort and 
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time into creating and strengthening institutions and structures for the well-being of the 
continent. These mechanisms enable the African continent to proactively handle crisis 
situations and reinforce their duty to the principles of R2P (Aning & Atuobi 92). The 
Ezulwini Consensus of March 2005, officially known as the Common African Position 
on UN reform, is a reiteration of African leaders to adhere to the obligation of states to 
protect their citizens and prevent any of crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. The AU has committed and dedicated itself to 
norms and principles of R2P – responsibility and accountability - not only on paper with 
the creation of such a broad legal framework but also technically with the formation of 
active branches for peace and security systems on the African continent.  
Article 4 (h) has led to the design of substantial new African institutions to face 
crippling issues on the continent. The production of these building blocks for regional 
peace include some significant changes such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC), 
the Panel of the Wise (PanWise), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and 
the African Standby Force (ASF) (Mepham & Ramsbotham 7). The PSC is the 
decision-making body of the AU and plays a similar role to that of the UNSC on the 
continental level. The main mission of PSC is to ensure peace and stability on the 
continent. This includes anticipation and prevention of conflicts, the organization of 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping initiatives if necessary and the reconstruction of an 
environment suitable for development. Coordination and harmonization of continental 
efforts are crucial to its mission in reducing violence and conflict. Its fifteen members 
are elected based on geographical representation. However, in contrast to the UNSC, 
members of the PSC have no veto power and none are permanent members (“Peace and 
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Security Council”). PSC is one of the main guarantors of the principles set in the AU 
Constitutive Act and is truly revolutionary in its role on the continent. Decisions 
concerning the continent thus can be taken in a more timely and effective manner.   
The Panel of the Wise (PanWise) formed in 2008 is similar to an advisory board 
for the PSC in conflict management and peace mediation. PanWise is composed of five 
members of different regions who are “highly respected African personalities from 
various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of 
peace, security and development on the continent.” (“Panel of the Wise”) PanWise 
provides the expertise and knowledge for PSC and the Commission to take decisive 
action. The panel acts as advisor on conflict prevention but also as a mediator between 
warring parties or states. It has a unique structure that makes up for the gap in the 
institutional lack of historical knowledge and precedence concerning peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping as mandated by the international system. The role of personalities and 
leadership should not be underestimated in a situation where novice institutions struggle 
for legitimacy and cannot outweigh the influence of leaders.  
The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is responsible for data 
collection and coordination with outside organizations for information management. 
CEWS advises the PSC on its decisions and provides the capital knowledge needed for 
adequate action. This AU branch works hand in hand with RECs and the AU. As 
opposed to a national intelligence agency, CEWS works more like a think tank and uses 
open source material for transparency and accountability. Its mission focuses explicitly 
on human security on the continent rather than national security (Cilliers 1). This again 
is an institutional innovation similar to PanWise and the PSC. CEWS strengthens the 
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capacity of PSC and PanWise to effectively analyze conflict risks and counter them 
effectively with less national bias than a centralized intelligence agency would (Cilliers 
2). Some points of focus on data collection are political instability due to abuse of 
power, ethnic politics or exclusionary politics, human rights violations and bad 
governance (Cilliers 3). 
The African Standby Force (ASF) is composed of five regional brigades and 
acts out the recommendations of the PSC. ASF is the rapid military deployment force of 
the PSC when in need of timely intervention. The multidimensional capabilities – 
military, policy and civilian on standby – are in charge of certain assignments such as: 
observation and monitoring, peace support operations, intervention, preventive 
deployment, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding including disarmament and 
demobilization (“The African Standby Force”). ASF is vital since it has the ability to 
act without waiting for international UN consensus which at times is simply too slow to 
be effective particularly when preventing genocide. Kioko believes that “It would 
appear that the UN Security Council has never complained about its powers being 
usurped because the interventions were in support of popular causes and were carried 
out partly because the UN Security Council had not taken action or was unlikely to do 
so at that time” (Kioko 821). The Ezulwini Consensus addresses this difficult issue in 
coordinating AU interventions and UNSC authorization. The Consensus highlights that 
the UN does not need to give away its authority but can approve of certain urgent 
actions after the matter (Mwansali 404). There is no fundamental discrepancy in AU 
initiative and the possibility of UN authority. Any action undertaken outside of the 
Article 4 (h) framework by any African state still remains illegal. This underscores 
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again the need of having African institutions that can act faster than the UNSC would 
be capable of. 
The AU’s relationship with the UN is complex and indispensable. It is 
complicated to divide the “type, nature and division of responsibilities” (Aning & 
Atuobi 105) between the different players. The UN may not always agree with actions 
taken by the PSC such as AMISOM mission in Somalia but the AU believes that it 
cannot always wait for UN approval to prevent, react and rebuild in an appropriate 
manner.  Kioko highlights in his writing this tense and intricate relationship:  
In deciding on intervention, the African Union will have to consider 
whether it will seek the authorization of the UN Security Council as it is 
required to do under Article 53 of the UN Charter. When questions were 
raised as to whether the Union could possibly have an inherent right to 
intervene other than through the Security Council, they were dismissed 
out of hand. This decision reflected a sense of frustration with the slow 
pace of reform of the international order, and with instances in which the 
international community tended to focus attention on other parts of the 
world at the expense of more pressing problems in Africa (Kioko 821).  
The international community expects the AU to take care of its own affairs when the 
UN cannot but the expectation is somewhat unrealistic because of the African context. 
The lack of resources is the main problem in the AU’s effectiveness in creating peace 
and preventing conflict. The continent needs more financial resources and knowledge. 
The primary concern is financial. The cost of interventions is high and the AU cannot 
afford the expenses because it is poorly endowed. In 2009, only 30 out of 54 states paid 
their dues to the Peace Fund for peace initiatives on the African continent (Kioko 821). 
Payments are unreliable and some states simply cannot contribute because of domestic 
troubles or priorities such as ongoing conflict, bureaucratic disorganization, 
administrative corruption, hefty development loans and other issues. The gap between 
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what was spent by the AU in 2009 and how much funds it received is drastic. The 
difference was covered by European Union (EU) funding and aid. However, this 
funding is somewhat uncomfortable because it has intentional and unintentional 
political implications. This “dependency” on foreign funds for African missions makes 
it difficult for the AU to operate without Western influence (Omorogbe 43). 
Furthermore, this lack of financial independence exacerbates a certain paradox in which 
the UN expects the AU to independently resolve its own problems according to 
dominant Western standards yet at the same time does not give it the means to do so. 
There is “an enormous financial burden attendant on any decision taken to intervene, 
which possibly will compel the African Union to call upon the United Nations to carry 
out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” (Kioko 
822) 
At the time of AU reforms in the early 2000s, the Union developed its peace and 
security structures to contribute to the UN mandate under Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter. As a result, the AU also expected support for its actions that went beyond 
verbal encouragements but this was not always the case and the expectations were not 
always so clear (Aning & Atuobi 104). The AU, because of its inexperience, needs the 
UN to assist it throughout its trials. African leaders have taken great steps to achieve 
and strive for the ideals expressed in the Genocide Convention and R2P. In turn, the UN 
must show its commitment in helping them concretely. Omorogbe in his analysis of the 
AU-UN relationship comes to the conclusion that the UN is key to the AU’s success in 
fostering peace and security on the continent (Omorogbe 53). The AU will inevitably 
struggle with the myriad of problems plaguing the continent. The UN’s responsibility is 
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to support the Union fully in its learning process. Helping the AU articulate clear and 
feasible mandates, assessing resources, providing financial aid and expertise are crucial 
for the success of African missions. Without the backing and support of the UN, the AU 
is frail and cannot demonstrate credibility and reliability in its missions: it is nothing but 
a paper tiger. It would be unrealistic to think that the AU is strong enough simply 
because of the creation of new branches such as the PSC, PanWise and ASF. 
Rethinking and reaffirming the meaning of partnership between the AU and the UN is 
crucial. Collaboration on missions will prevent the backfiring and the undermining of 
the AU that has struggled to reform and adopt a new identity. The creation of an AU-
UN 10 year capacity building programme initiated in 2012 highlights the need for UN-
AU hybrid missions and enhances cooperation between the two organizations. This 
enterprise underlines the UN’s commitment and necessity to provide advice and support 
to the AU and its peacebuilding institutions (Omorogbe 42). The international 
community is responsible for the success of AU responsibility.  
Despite the fact that the African continent struggles with the lack of financial 
resources and institutional experience, the AU’s reforms and efforts in preventing 
conflict and genocide are impressive. The systems put in place are innovative and 
dynamic and match the reality and the needs of the 21st century. These tools that have 
been established are a fundamental for development in the long-run and are first steps 
towards the institutionalization of values and principles of human rights, human 
security, peace and stability. The initiatives taken by the African continent are 
significant in their meaning but also in their effects. These systems may be new and 
somewhat confused but missions such as the ones in Burundi, Somalia and Darfur have 
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shown the AU’s commitment to the values it has set itself (Omorogbe 62) in accordance 
with those of the UN agreements. With time and sufficient support, it is possible for the 
AU to establish its legitimacy and effectiveness. The coordination of different branches 
of the AU cooperatively with the UN offers numerous possibilities for all to stay 
accountable to R2P.  
All the tools for genocide prevention in Africa exist. The international 
community has no excuse to avoid the implementation of the international norms and 
principles for peace. The key is to wield these tools adroitly, carefully and tactfully. The 
tools are not perfect but by recognizing the difficulties and their potential, it is possible 
to move beyond the limits of what has been done in the past. The exploit of creating a 
universal understanding of ethics concerning the worst crimes of all has been done. The 
feat of establishing instruments to carry out these goals has also been accomplished. 
The next step is the implementation of these standards. The crisis in the Central African 
Republic is a test trial for effective genocide prevention in the 21st century. 
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Crisis in the Central African Republic  
Historical Background 
The Central African Republic (CAR) is the obscure and forgotten heart of 
Africa. The life expectancy at birth of 50 old and a total literacy rate is 37% is quite 
alarming (CIA World Factbook; Olugboji). Statistics on the disastrous conditions of life 
there are endless and one cannot help but wonder how this situation is possible and 
acceptable in the 2015. The reality is that the CAR has been Joseph Conrad’s “heart of 
darkness” for over centuries. The central African region has a most severe history of 
blood, violence, exploitation and pain yet it goes unnoticed.  
Long before European imperialism, the Egyptians and Sudanese merchants 
raided Northern parts of what is the CAR today for valuable resources such as ivory and 
for slaves to trade in wealthier northern and eastern regions of the African continent 
where commerce was flourishing (“The State of the World’s Refugees”). In the late 
1800s, the French colonized the Ubangi-Shari region which is where the CAR is 
located. Inspired by King Leopold II’s management of the Congo Free State, the French 
set out to rule Ubangi-Shari similarly with extreme violence. From the very beginning 
of “globalization”, central Africa has been established as a place where anarchy and 
lawlessness were acceptable and even desirable if only it benefitted the rest of the 
world. Atrocity crimes were prevalent in this region and it was considered normal to 
treat the indigenous and native people as inhuman creatures. Centuries of ignoring and 
accepting violent treatment of Central Africans only reinforced the idea that part of the 
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world does not matter as long as the rest can live at peace while profiting from their 
misery. 
As the years passed under the French abusive colonial rule, missionaries 
established themselves to “save” the Africans. By initiating them to Christianity, there 
was hope that one day they would come out of their “wretchedness” and understand 
why God placed them in such an environment. The French companies and 
administrative military organizers chiseled artificial borders and power structures into 
the flesh of the land. “French authorities gave preference in education to ethnic groups 
near Bangui, the capital. This created an elite among the Southern Riverine peoples – 
including the Ngbaka, Yakoma and Ubang. This elite dominated ruling positions in the 
CAR until 1996 even though northern and central ethnic groups are more populous, 
creating resentment among northern and central groups” (Nawoyski). The missionaries 
reinforced this carving of the land by distinguishing between different ethnic groups 
according to how fast native Africans2 could assimilate the religion. By doing so, 
missionaries enhanced the existent hierarchy created by the politicians and furthermore 
emphasized privilege based on ethnic identity. The educated central African elite 
emerged and organized itself accordingly to the system created by the French. They 
were able to enjoy the new power structures that allowed them to exploit those who had 
not adjusted or accommodated the foreign system rapidly enough. The elite exchanged 
their own people for weapons with foreign companies that came to extract resources 
from the heart of Africa (“The State of the World’s Refugees”). Gold, timber, ivory, 
diamonds and human beings were ruthlessly sucked from of the land. Central Africans                                                         2 I want to note how imprecise this word is here. “African” was not an established identity at the time. 
This anachronism is here to help simplify matters and provide a general understanding of the situation.  
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were pitted against each other for survival. This was beneficial for the French. As long 
as things were kept in the darkness, the rest of society could live on unperturbed. This 
cycle of physical, mental and emotional violence continued until the advent of World 
War II where again, central Africans were used to protect the lives of those who seemed 
to matter more.  
In 1960, under the pressure of the wave of independence rebellions, the French 
decided to give Ubangi-Shari more autonomy: the CAR “gained” independence. Like 
many others, the new CAR was a country with rule of law, democracy, an elected 
government and all the other foreign things that come with it. David Dacko, once the 
moment had come, was “elected”, seized power, suppressed the opposition and ruled as 
a tyrant. This was the way things had been run for centuries because it worked for those 
in power. Meanwhile, the powerless could not make change to the system so life, time 
and history continued on without significant improvement. The French persisted in their 
role of puppet masters of the African elite. Here and there they inconspicuously 
supported a few coups d’états. Chad, Libya, Sudan and numerous other countries all had 
a role to play in the thirty years of political turbulence and military governments 
following the 1960 independence. This unstoppable cycle of violence is an underlying 
cause of the recent conflicts on the verge of genocide. 
The CAR, like many African states that were delineated in rather incoherent 
ways for the convenience of colonial powers, is home to many different ethnic, tribal 
and religious groups. There are eight main different ethnic groups in the CAR. Baya and 
Banda, the two largest ethnic groups represent about 30% of the population each. 50% 
to 70% of Central Africans identify as Christian, 15% as Muslim and the rest adhere to 
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indigenous beliefs (CIA Factbook). Both dominant religions incorporate strong 
animistic rituals and practices. Muslims, Christians and many others in rural and urban 
areas still believe in witchcraft and sorcery which are among the most commonly 
reported crimes in the CAR (CIA World Factbook ; Lombard & Batianga-Kinzi 13). 
Religious divisions become particularly salient when power and privilege overlap them. 
The American CAR expert, Louisa Lombard in the New York Times article “Making 
War Not Peace”, argues that the roots of the conflict go back to the mid-90s, when the 
rivalry between General Patassé and Francois Bozizé tore the country along sectarian 
lines. Patassé favored the northern Central Africans who were disenfranchised under the 
previous leadership. “Politicization of the North-South ethnic divide began under 
Kolingba continued under the Patassé government, as he moved to appoint northerners 
to positions of patronage in place of southerners.” (The State of the World’s Refugees”) 
In 2003, with the help of predominantly Muslim Chadian mercenaries, Bozizé 
instigated a successful coup. Unfortunately, he proved himself to be just as incompetent 
as Patassé when it came to the administration of the country.  
His main focus, like all the leaders that came before him, was on the capital of 
the CAR, Bangui, and the management of resources extracted from the rest of the 
country. People in the rural areas and peripheries of the country struggled to survive. 
Rather than addressing the people’s needs and grievances, Bozizé attacked organized 
communities of opposition in order to pre-empt insurrections (Lombard, “Making War 
Not Peace”). To stay in power, he manipulated funding and sponsorship from 
international institutions by pretending to appease his military and political opponents 
through insincere democratic dialogue. Generals Patassé and Bozizé put the country 
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through about ten years of intense struggle for power in the early 2000s. The CAR 
“Bush War” between armed groups supporting Patassé and Bozizé finally ended with 
peace agreements led by Gabon and the international community in 2008. A consensus 
government including rebel leaders was formed in 2010 but it was badly implemented 
since none of the armed groups supporting different representatives in the government 
were disarmed. Clashes between Bozizé’s troops and rebel groups continued and human 
rights violations were prevalent throughout the country. Kidnappings, rape, torture, 
exploitation, looting, pillages were daily occurrences. The supposed free and fair 
elections that Bozizé held in 2011 failed to reflect any democratic initiative. Lombard 
re-emphasizes how disconnected Central African leaders were from their people:  
From the colonial era to today, for example, the government of the 
C.A.R. has lived off kickbacks while leaving rural authorities mostly to 
their own devices. National politicians make promises to international 
actors but pursue their own ends. And factionalism flourishes because 
heading up a rebel group is a good way to be taken seriously (Lombard, 
“Making War Not Peace”).  
Too many voices were suppressed. As a last resort, the voiceless picked up arms to 
make their voices heard. Bozizé’s opponents gained momentum with the general rising 
anger. They organized rural communities on the outskirts of cities into rebel groups. It 
was relatively easy for rebels to advance towards the capital in the Southwest of the 
country since the government was so out of touch with its rural towns and villages. 
Governmental forces such as policemen and military often fled when seeing the arrival 
of the rebels who were better armed and prepared than they were. In order to slow down 
the bubbling and advancing organized rebellion and on the demand of the Chadian 
president, Idris Deby, Bozizé negotiated conditions of peace in which fighters were 
promised the spoils of any leftovers from international programs. 
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The international community did not idly sit and watch as conflict simmered. 
The UN led the MINURCAT peacekeeping operation on the Northern border. From 
2007 to 2010, MINURCAT had the mandate of protecting civilians. Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration programs (DDR) were widespread but “by 2011, 
after two years and more than 50 meetings during which no important political issue 
was addressed, the millions allocated to the program had more or less run out. Nothing 
had been done for former combatants. But the members of the committee [Bozizé and 
his cronies], as well as foreign staffers, had pocketed comfortable salaries.” (Lombard, 
“Making War Not Peace”) Valuable resources were wasted and again, the voiceless in 
society, who had their weapons confiscated, were once again reduced to silence. By 
disarming the rebels, the international community had taken away the vector for the 
voice of the most disenfranchised in society while the leaders continued to thrive under 
international support. The power structures of the Bush War were not eliminated but in 
fact were furthermore enhanced. The international community created a time bomb for 
itself.   
Meanwhile, conflict from neighboring countries spilled over into the CAR. In 
the North, the humanitarian situation was delicate because of troubles in Chad and 
Sudan. The Lord’s Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony launched insurgencies in the 
south and south east corner of the country bringing with it instability and violence from 
Uganda. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo 
stream in by from the south looking for a safe haven that did not exist in the CAR. 
The UN’s Framework Analysis of Atrocity Crimes provides a list of risk factors 
for genocide. Many can be identified in the CAR. A situation of instability, violations of 
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international human rights and humanitarian law in addition to weak state structures and 
institutions since the 90s created favorable conditions for genocide. Because the state 
apparatus was so corrupt and mismanaged and because previous international initiatives 
for conflict prevention were inadequate, there was a major absence of mitigating factors 
in case of the outbreak of widespread violence. The creation of many rebel groups and 
local self-defense groups of militias or mercenaries is indicative of the general 
discontent with the government. The lack of outlets to express grievances and the fact 
that no one in the administration was able or willing to address the population’s 
complaints without the use was violence was morbidly foreboding. Motives and 
incentive for the use of violence as a means to express anger, frustration and 
dissatisfaction were ample and sufficient. Furthermore, Central Africans have the 
capacity to commit atrocity crimes. After all, no official structures were stopping them 
and light and small arms were streaming into the country from abroad. The 
Framework’s last significant risk is a trigger factor or pivotal action: the Séléka’s 
alliance in December 2012. 
Genocide in the Making 
The dysfunctional overlapping layers of power structures assembled over 
centuries could no longer hold together. The fragility of this system was revealed in the 
implosion of the CAR in the past three years which led to the acts of genocide from 
2012-2014. This study looks at the process of genocide using Stanton’s “The Ten 
Stages of Genocide”.  
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Classification, Discrimination Polarization: Decanting society’s different components  
For the most part, Muslims and Christians in the CAR lived together peacefully. 
Muslim children went to schools set up by catholic missionaries and vice versa. 
Different communities lived together in more or less of a healthy manner (Bouckaert, 
“Escaping From a Nightmare; Phelps Photo Essay; Lombard, “Religious Rhetoric As 
Cover”). The nominal identifications of “Christian’ and “Muslim” were not particularly 
important seeing as many of them shared animistic rituals, superstitions and habits 
having lived next to one another in neighboring villages for decades. However, “it is not 
the mere existence or diversity of ethnic groups that is a defining characteristic of the 
region. Rather, it is the degree to which myths and narratives about certain ethnic 
groups have become entrenched in societies and are utilized in wars and genocides that 
is important” (McDoom 563). Power dynamics separated the two groups and fostered 
an environment of mistrust and animosity. The difference in between the two groups 
was the subtle distribution of power and status within society. This power division 
created jealousies that ultimately led to dangerous rivalries.  
Historically, the CAR’s Muslim community controlled economic power and 
conducted commerce, business and trade. Muslim communities lived mostly in Bangui, 
in the South West or in the North and Northwest regions of the CAR close to Chad and 
Sudan. Diamonds and other natural resources were mainly managed by Muslim groups 
who lived in areas where the resources happened to be in abundance (Hilgert). 
International social and religious networks that reached into neighboring countries gave 
the Muslim community opportunities to accumulate wealth in ways that other groups 
such as the Christians farmers could not. The fact that the minority group of Muslims 
 
 
44  
were better off than the majority group of Christians in the CAR was considered 
suspicious. Similarly to the Jews during the early 20th century, many apprehended 
Muslims because “wealth without visible function is much more intolerable because 
nobody can understand why it should be tolerated.” (Arendt 4) Furthermore, Bozizé’s 
doubtful dealings with Chad increased reservations against Muslims who were 
associated with Chadian and Sudanese foreigners. Many of the Northern Muslims spoke 
Arabic and not Sango or French. Mistrust of the Muslim community was prevalent in 
other social groups (Lombard, “Religious Rhetoric as Cover”) and this would be a 
problem throughout the course of the conflict since Muslim Central Africans are not 
always fully considered citizens. At certain roadblocks for example, Muslims tend to 
have to pay a higher fee in order to pass through since they are not recognized as 
citizens even though they may have spent their whole entire life in the CAR (Lombard). 
It is often harder for them to get paperwork done for identification cards so it is a 
common phenomenon that Muslims adopt a Christian name as well (Bloggingheads TV 
Golberg & Lombard). Under Bozizé’s control, the Central African statehouse was 
lenient with the Chadian mercenaries all over the country that allowed him to stay in 
power. This impunity of foreigners angered and threatened the Christian majority. 
Christians historically controlled political power and have demographic advantage. 
They occupied territory and represented the political majority which often did not take 
into account the desires and the needs of different communities. Many of them can be 
considered farmers or peasants (for lack of a better word in English) who own land and 
live off of very basic agriculture.  
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Differences between Christians and Muslims are not clear. These do not exactly 
match historical injustices that stem mainly from poor governance. These differences do 
not match the numerous ethnic tribal differences either: neighboring villages may have 
distinct religions and even families within the same village may adhere to different 
faiths. Louisa Lombard argues in “Religious Rhetoric as Cover” that the rhetoric of 
religion or identification based on religion is used as a cover for Central African 
disputes that are mainly due to socio-economic lags and inequalities created by flawed 
power structures in society. She explains that national wars are excuses for more 
localized score settling. “Delving into “other aspects of the targets’ identities besides 
their religion […] reveals a mosaic of jealousy and mistrust and a range of festering, 
localized conflicts in a context of socio-economic duress.” (Lombard, “Religion 
Rhetoric as Cover”). These involve the dynamics between foreigners including 
refugees, Sudanese, Chadians, Ugandans and nationals, farmers and herders, nomads 
and land owners, merchants and politicians. Layers of localized conflict led to 
dissatisfaction with the system in place which took an extreme turn of events in 2012 
with the alliance of Northern rebel groups.  
The Séléka emerged in this very specific context. “Séléka” in Sango means 
union. This rebel coalition formed in the North of the CAR was a response to Bozizé’s 
failure to comply with peace treaties of the Bush War and his agreements with rebel 
leaders of the pre-dominantly Muslim communities. In other words, the Séléka formed 
because Bozizé did not disarm his militias and did not live up to the duties of his 
presidency. The Séléka alliance was supported by Chadian mercenaries and was funded 
by the diamond trade. They took control of the Northern and Central parts of the 
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country and marched towards Bangui in the south looting, raping, kidnapping, pillaging 
and burning villages to the ground on their way. 
In January 2013, peace talks took place between the Séléka and Bozizé. They 
were to establish a coalition government where both parties would be included in the 
decision-making process of shaping a new vision for the future of the CAR. Agreements 
were made on amnesty, the use of arms, DDR programs, human rights violations and 
new parliamentary elections. Change was happening at the political level but the people 
themselves felt just as insecure as before. Many Christians fled their homes having 
sensed the imminent implosion of the failing state. Thousands amassed in refugee 
camps near the airport. In March 2013, the coalition broke apart. Both sides accused 
each other of not respecting the previously established agreement. The Séléka settled in 
Bangui and Bozizé fled the country. Michel Djotodia, who at that time headed the 
Séléka, took power. He established a transitional government because of pressures from 
the international community and the African Union. It was obvious however that 
Djotodia had no control over the Séléka rebels who brutalized the population in the 
capital. The Séléka refused to disband, not wanting to be tricked by another politician 
again.  
As a response, pre-dominantly Christian communities for self-defense loosely 
banded together under the Anti-Balaka - “anti-machete” in Sango. The Anti-Balaka 
fought back with just as much vehemence trying to establish their presence and, above 
all, protect their homes. Violence started spiraling out of control as the Séléka and Anti-
Balaka perpetuated atrocity crimes against their respective communities. Towns and 
villages were annihilated. Livelihoods were obliterated. Many fled the capital.  
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Classification and discrimination were obvious even before the official start of 
the conflict but these only enhanced the polarization of society once the fighting broke 
out throughout the country. Different groups have different statuses in the Central 
African social context. Each group has an advantage over the other yet each group 
thinks of itself as a victim. Those who would not take sides, either that of the Anti-
Balaka or of the Séléka would be subject to the worst possible treatment before dying 
frightfully. Neutrality was an automatic death sentence. Many might not have felt a 
particular allegiance to one group or another but would associate themselves with one 
out of necessity for defense and protection. Colonial power structures that were left to 
fester in the CAR finally broke apart after decades into bloodbath and anarchy.  
Symbolization and Organization- Visible separation 
The Séléka and the Anti-Balaka were both quite disorganized and had a weak 
chain of command. Most of them organically sprouted from different older rebel 
movements such as the People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) and 
Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) or simply formed out of practicality 
in certain villages and towns. The Séléka with sufficient funding and organization 
adopted somewhat of a common uniform and used small and light machine guns and 
other weapons. Their chain of command was much clearer than that of the Anti-Balaka. 
The Anti-Balaka grew out of anger and had no strict political agenda except revenge 
against injustice inflicted upon them by the Séléka and Northern invaders. The Anti-
Balaka could be identified by the gris-gris amulets that they carried around their necks. 
These were said to replace bullet proof vests (Olugboji). They armed themselves with 
machetes, bows and arrows, spears and homemade guns. Although these might seem 
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less harmful than actual guns, the sheer number of Anti-Balaka across the country 
makes them extremely dangerous.  
Each group organized itself differently and took over villages in order to 
establish their territories. Frightened civilians fled as soon as news of their arrival was 
delivered. Muslims fled north and into Cameroon or Chad. The CAR was very roughly 
divided into two parts (see Figure 3). The North and the North East as well as the 
numerous mines in the center of the country were under the influence of the Séléka. The 
East, the South and the South West were occupied by the Anti-Balaka. Bangui had a 
particular situation of its own and after foreign intervention, it needed to be secured as 
neutral.  
This type of organization on the part of the different warring parties often 
precedes genocide. Conflict in the CAR was not an insurgency, a temporary rebellion or 
a capricious violent tantrum. Conflict in the CAR was (and is) a type of war against a 
specific group. The groups initially formed to defend certain rights, power and ideals 
but as the conflict carried on and as different individuals joined, violence started 
carrying a specific tinge of indiscriminate hatred and vengeance.  The interesting and 
terrifying aspect of the conflict in the CAR was that “genocide” was committed on both 
sides.  
Genocide: Preparation, dehumanization, persecution and extermination 
Chaos, fear and anger without restraint created an overpowering mob effect in 
the CAR. The Séléka and the Anti-Balaka could not see how they could coexist 
together. Looting, raping, shootings and drug dealings became daily routines. 
Disagreements ended in automatic executions. A questionable look could end in a death 
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sentence. The goal for both sides was to see how long it would take to strangle the other 
side. By terrorizing the population, the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka attempted to cut the 
other group’s support base. “Anti-Balaka, framed their grievances using the idioms of 
religion and foreignness: they sought, they said, to rid the country of troublesome 
Muslim-foreigners, particularly those coming from the AR/Chad/South Darfur 
borderlands. In reality, they cast a far wider net, and all Muslims in CAR were subject 
to persecution” (Lombard & Batianga-Kinzi 3).Writings on the wall such as: “We do 
not want any more Muslims in our country. We will finish them all off, this country 
belongs to the Christians!” (Olugboji) are common. Some of the most atrocious crimes 
seemed to come straight out of Rwanda’s genocide. Cannibalism, dismembering of 
body parts, public decapitations are just some examples of occurrences in the CAR in 
2013. Burned bodies pile up in the streets of Bangui. Thousands of deaths could be 
counted on both sides. Numbers vary between 2,500 and 6,000 according to Reuters and 
Associated Press in 20143. No one is spared the violence; aid workers, journalists, 
doctors, imams, priests have all fallen victim to the violence.  
August 2013 marked the complete breakdown of the state apparatus. Civil services 
were no longer provided. Water, electricity, health facilities and educational institutions 
were no longer functional in the capital so even less so in the rest of the country. The 
price of basic goods such as milk, water and salt have rose to absurd amounts. Looting                                                         3 Numbers vary greatly because of the lack of information on the ground. Peacekeepers cannot keep track 
of the number in addition to their numerous responsibilities. The state cannot afford to count. Fatalities 
linked with the conflict are limited to a few thousand and even then, this number only includes those who 
died from wounds in hospitals or those who were buried. If the numbers are to include secondary deaths 
due to the conflict, they would soar up to hundreds of thousands since many were and are dying of 
hunger, disease and many other factors due to displacement. Furthermore, time of the conflict is a 
significant player too. Different NGOs record deaths at different times and it is hard to find a specific 
number at the “peak” of the conflict.  
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and pillaging was the only way for many to survive. Millions of people fled the country 
and their “non-attributed” zones. The country slowly split in half as Muslims headed up 
North. Partition of the country was considered but ultimately rejected by the African 
Union and the international community. Coexistence would be the only option for 
peace. 
The UNSC observed a complete collapse of law and order. The meltdown in the 
CAR was a serious threat to regional stability. In the fall of 2013, after dismembering 
the Séléka, Djotodia followed Bozizé into exile in Benin. Catherine Samba- Panza, 
major of Bangui, was elected as interim president by the Central African elite in the 
capital. She received wide support from the international community. In a conciliatory 
gesture to the Séléka groups, she appointed a Muslim as prime minister: Mahamat 
Kamoun (Eckel & Bagassi). Despite Samba-Panza’s efforts to rebuild the state, the 
CAR was clearly disintegrating faster than she could put it back together.  
At the end of the year, the UNSC and the French government warned of impending 
genocide. An urgent red flag was raised for the international community. France 
qualified the situation in the CAR as “on the verge of genocide” (Irish). Widespread 
violence continued unabated and violence on Muslims increased exponentially as the 
Anti-Balaka gained ground in the capital and the Séléka were pushed back into the 
North. Clashes between the two groups intensified. Humanitarian catastrophes were 
extensive and pervasive. International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) on the 
ground could not possibly handle the situation on their own. In the best documented 
Christian refugee camp in the Bangui Airport, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) was the 
only organization present helping and supporting the displaced. MSF indicated that they 
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only had four doctors cater the 100,000 displaced civilians (“République 
Centrafricaine”). Whether the international community wanted to call the situation 
genocide or not, the situation was unbearable. 
Importance of stability in the CAR 
The international community watched in horror as the #CARcrisis photos that 
streamed in from the CAR on social media seemed to resemble more and more 
traumatic memories of the Rwandan genocide that had taken place only 20 years earlier. 
It was impossible for the international community to ignore the tragedy for ethical and 
moral reasons but political, cultural and economic factors contributed to rapid 
intervention as well. These further emphasized why it was crucial for the world to react 
and prevent the imminent large scale genocide that was about to take place. If the heart 
of Africa was to give away, the whole world would collapse with it. 
The abundance of natural resources in the CAR is unique. The CAR is the 
world’s 5th larger exporter of diamonds and diamonds are the lead export product in the 
CAR (CIA Factbook). These are the official statistics. Diamonds are easily sold 
elsewhere in different manners so profit made from diamond trade must be higher and 
more significant that many could imagine (Eckel & Bagassi). The CAR has a huge 
amount of untapped resources that are currently waiting to be extracted.  Timber, 
diamonds, gold, uranium, other minerals and an incredible diversity of flora and fauna 
are located in the heart of Africa. This inconspicuous country holds a significant amount 
of valuable treasures that need to be preserved. Deforestation is enhanced by the 
conflict since rebel groups hide in the jungle and many flee there for protection as well. 
For many, the forest is the last resource sustaining life since they can no longer farm, 
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herd, trade or work. Elephant poaching is a thriving business in the CAR and with the 
breakdown of the state, there is even less supervision than before. There is such a 
wealth of unexploited riches that the international community could not let the country 
disintegrate (“La Centrafrique Dans Le Chaos”).  
In addition to this environmental and economic imperative of stability in the 
CAR, there is also a regional imperative. The CAR is a landlocked country surrounded 
by “bad” neighbors. If it were to break apart, it would bring down all those around. The 
power vacuum would create a hole of anarchy in the continent and a perfect 
environment for the growth of terrorist groups. The presence of Boko Haram in 
Northern Cameroon does not bode well especially when Muslims are actively being 
persecuted and discriminated against in the CAR (McNeish). Chadian and Sudanese 
mercenaries already profit significantly from the lax business regulations by stealing 
resources from the CAR. Without a stable CAR capable of development and global 
integration, within a few years, it will become a regional dump for weapons, toxic junk 
and criminals. Indeed, if the CAR were to disintegrate into anarchy, the country could 
become a safe haven for certain criminals seeking refuge outside of their own countries. 
Borders are porous in this area of the world as shown by the presence of Joseph Kony 
and the LRA. In fact, Kony himself called the CAR a safe haven. Complete anarchy in 
the CAR would allow similar militias and traffickers from neighboring countries to hide 
within the country itself. The possibility of justice, rule of law, order and democracy in 
the entire region would be impossible since all hope would flow out of the CAR like 
water in a strainer. Regional terrorism would be unstoppable and prospects of regional 
peace would be futile.  
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The last factor contributing to international reaction was the fact that the 
international community had invested too much in the rebuilding of this region with 
previous operations such as MINURCAT and BINURCA that abandoning it would 
doom not only the CAR to failure but also the international community itself. Sunk 
costs do not exist in humanitarian aid and peacekeeping. Humiliation from impotence in 
Rwanda seemed particularly fresh with the 20 year commemoration of the tragedy in 
April 2014. The CAR was in a dire situation to say the least but all the tools to prevent 
the spiraling of violence into full scale genocide were available. The international 
community took upon themselves the responsibility to protect. 
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Genocide Prevention: Application of Existent Tools 
2013 AU and ECCAS: MISCA 
With the impending warning of genocide, the African Union (AU) and the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) immediately took action by 
initiating peace talks in January 2013 in Libreville, Gabon. Despite the numerous 
criticism of the effectiveness of these peace talks, it should be recognized that the PSC 
acted swiftly by imposing travel bans and an asset freeze on the Séléka leadership 
(Dersso). Furthermore, the AU’s PSC reinforced previous missions such as BINUCA 
that had been formerly established as a peace monitoring force in the region. La Force 
Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMAC) was adapted to fit the specific mission 
and became the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African 
Republic (MISCA). MISCA was launched by the AU after the UNSC resolution 2127 
to stabilize the country after the 2013 coup d’état by the Séléka. With the authorization 
of PSC, African troops were pulled from all over the continent including Gabon, Chad, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi, Rwanda and Cameroon within a week to protect civilians. 
Because of a significant lack of funds and resources and the urgency of the situation, 
France guaranteed its support to stabilize the region. It was agreed that the AU, the 
European Union (EU) and the French would ensure the beginning of the operations 
(R2P’s Prevention and Reaction pillars) and that the UN would eventually take over in 
terms of reconstruction and support to the transitional government through the 
MINUSCA peacekeeping operations (R2P’s Rebuilding pillar).  
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Its initial mandate was to: protect civilians, humanitarian aid workers and 
INGOs on the ground and freeze rebel group capabilities of enacting violence. 
Occupying space and establishing a presence to indicate the international community’s 
condemnation of the situation was crucial in order to decrease the violence. After the 
Peace and Security Summit in Paris in December 2013, due to the dramatic evolving 
circumstances in the CAR, the French government agreed to the deployment of 
thousands of troops overnight in order to the support the AU initiative. Thus the 
MISCA mission arrived at about 3000 troops within a week in early December. The EU 
agreed to provide equipment and other material aid in support of the AU mission as 
well.  
This formidable action taken within a week of the UNSC announcement of acts 
of genocide in the CAR is significant. Rapid and effective action can take place with the 
willingness of just a few states. If major powers such as France, the United Kingdom 
and Chad on the UNSC may rally aid so fast, than it is possible for effective change to 
take place. International presence on the ground states clearly that such atrocity crimes 
will not be tolerated by the international community. This stance is essential in genocide 
prevention in particular when thinking about the rapid developments of the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994. UN peacekeepers stood passively when hundreds were massacred 
which confirmed the Hutu suspicion that no international action would be taken. The 
Hutu génocidaires tested the extent to which the international community cared about 
this issue and the meekness of the UN peacekeepers indicated to them that all hell could 
break loose and no one would do anything about it. In the CAR, with the sudden 
increase of troops on the ground, data collection, information sharing and the 
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cooperation of different international forces was possible. Understanding the situation 
on the ground was the first vital step for the eventual design of an adequate 
peacekeeping operation in the long-run (PKO).  
2014 France and the EU: Opération Sangaris and EUFOR RCA 
Opération Sangaris Soon after the deployment of MISCA, France initiated its 7th 
intervention in the CAR since the country’s independence (France Inter). Following 
Ban Ki-Moon’s six point recommendation, the French initiated a rapid reinforcement of 
the AU and its forces. The initial mandate of Opération Sangaris was to support 
MISCA. 2,000 French troops thus accompanied MISCA and supported their mission 
(“Opération Sangaris”).  France made it clear that support did not mean buying new 
material for African troops but rather to help them in their mission by increasing their 
ability to manage the the organization of their operations (“Les Objectifs de la Nouvelle 
Opération”). Upon their arrival, their mandate needed to be enlarged and adapt to the 
circumstances on the ground. Thus, the French adopted the new mission of 
demilitarizing and securing certain zones in the capital and its periphery for civilian 
populations. Furthermore, the French troops would be opening access to more isolated 
and remote towns and villages in order to provide access for humanitarian aid 
(“Opération Sangaris”). Ultimately, their goal was to secure an environment for a 
normal political process to take place. Opération Sangaris mobilized French troops from 
all over the Central African region. They allowed MISCA to operate beyond Bangui 
and secure a larger portion of the country including its major cities such as Bouar in the 
Northwest (ethnic cleansing committed by the Anti-Balaka against the Muslim 
communities), Bambari in the South (Christians and Muslims displaced) and Bangassou 
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in the South East (persecution of Muslims and Christians). François Hollande made it 
clear that Opération Sangaris was to be short, rapid and efficient. He hoped that it 
would embody the new French military doctrine in Africa: help African missions 
transition, help relieve AU PKOs (“Centrafrique: Les Français Prêts”). Hollande no 
longer wanted France to be the “policeman” of Africa and in its former colonies. France 
could not be responsible for failures in Africa but it would do its best to help African 
states live up to their responsibilities towards their own populations.  
When seeing French and AU troops, civilians of Bouar were overjoyed at the 
prospects of better living conditions and security (“Vaste Opération à Bangui”). 
Without the French troops at the airport, Christian refugees would not be able to find 
any peace in the capital. Joint operations with MISCA ran smoothly and in particular 
the demilitarization of the Anti-Balaka stronghold in Boy-Rab in February 2014. There, 
Patrice Edouard Ngaisonna and other leaders of the Anti-Balaka were arrested. 
Furthermore, they effectively destroyed munitions in Sakpanboro and secured the 
market place of Bambari in April 2015 (“Sangaris: Sécurisation”).  
MISCA and Opération Sangaris were essential to saving the lives of civilians 
and preventing the worsening of the dramatic situation in the CAR. Massacres have 
halted and that is a very first step to reorganizing the CAR. Over 5,000 deaths were 
recorded in 2014; 100 were recorded in 2015 so far. Many criticize the French and 
African operations because they were not effective at creating peace or complete 
stability in the region. However, their core mission was not to establish peace. The 
French mission was to support AU forces in securing the capital and opening up access 
for humanitarian aid. This has been achieved successfully and underlines the ability of 
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the French troops to set realistic and feasible goals in coordination with the AU. 
Although the crisis on the ground exceeded the capabilities of the two forces and the 
number of troops deployed as seen by the continuation of human rights violations on the 
ground, changes were visible (UN MINUSCA). French leaders, however, were not 
trying to delude themselves that the mission was complete and finished. They are aware 
that in order for things to return to normal, the Muslim communities of Bangui that have 
fled north should have the possibility of returning home. The main mission of a rapid, 
effective supportive force for the AU has been accomplished successfully. As of now, 
the French have decreased the number of troops on the ground while waiting for the 
progressive arrival of over 12,000 UN peacekeepers. It will be helping MISCA transfer 
to MINUSCA. Again, the French troops reinforce the idea that the international 
community will not let genocide take place and that civilian lives do matter in the larger 
international prospect of things. Despite its simultaneous commitment in Mali, France 
was able to step up and provide assistance in times of need. Intervention in Mali against 
terrorism is just as important as the responsibility to protect. This shows that the 
international community truly has gone a long way from the past and that they are 
willing to support the new developments of the AU peacekeeping forces.  
EUFOR RCA 
After the EU Foreign Ministers approved the creation of EUFOR RCA and the 
UN Security Council adopted the UNSC Resolution 2134 in January 2014, the EU was 
able to deploy its (mainly French) troops. Under the UN Chapter VII charter, EUFOR 
RCA would use “all necessary means” to implement its mandate and protect civilians 
(Tardy) so as to facilitate the takeover by MINUSCA eventually at the end of 2014. The 
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goal was to be in the CAR by March and reach full operational capacity of 1,000 troops 
by May. Unfortunately, the mission was delayed due to insufficient commitments. 
General Philippe Ponties only had 750 troops deployed by June 2014 and France 
irritably had to fill the gaps to end the force generation process. Full operational 
capacity was reached and the disarmament of the Séléka took place in the EU controlled 
areas of the capital. EUFOR RCA and CAR forces patrolled the city. Disarmament was 
not easy because the Séléka stopped wearing their uniforms and took on the role of 
civilians. Despite this fact, violence decreased considerably in the capital.  
EUFOR RCA hinged on security and humanitarian purposes for both the Central 
African region and for the European Union. EUFOR RCA was in line with R2P and a 
response to the French and UN warning of a genocide emergency in the CAR in 
December 2013. EUFOR RCA is the 9th EU operation using military means with 
reference to humanitarian concerns (Bak 7). The EU itself stems from an ideal of peace 
and security on the European continent. In this line of thought, the EU felt obliged to 
adhere to the French initiative to intervene in the CAR although this was done not 
without great reticence and lack of support from the strongest members of the Union 
such as the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and Italy. The concern for the potential of 
a large scale humanitarian conflict in the Central African region and its effects on an 
already highly volatile Sahel region worried the EU who felt uncomfortable about the 
prospect of an unstable and violent African continent (EEAS March 2014). The 
humanitarian undertones of EUFOR RCA to secure Central Africa were the official 
justifications for intervention. However, these were maybe not the main force behind 
the mission. “The EU aligned itself with the idea of justifying military interventions 
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with reference to humanitarian concerns” (Bak 13) but did so perhaps more for its own 
political and economic security.  
The EU and its member states ideally would like to be seen as a security 
provider on the global political terrain and would also like to secure their economic 
assets and interests abroad. EUFOR RCA stemmed from the framework of the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) where the EU in 2001 dedicated itself to “project 
stability also beyond its own borders.” (Bak 15). Intervention in the CAR was a 
humanitarian imperative for global security but also a chance for the EU to establish a 
common defense strategy – or at least attempt to do so. EUFOR RCA initiated and led 
by the French, furthermore, had implicit economic drives. The CAR may be the poorest 
nation according to the World Bank but it remains a country full of potential in terms of 
its availability in natural resources such as timber, diamonds and uranium. National 
interests form the EU interests. “The underlying truth should be clear: France deployed 
troops to protect the uranium operations conducted by Areva since France’s main 
source of electricity generation is nuclear power” (Hermann). Uranium deposits are thus 
important for national energy security back on the old continent. If the mines were to 
fall into the hands of the rebels then it would be more complicated to access those cheap 
resources. Additionally, maybe this initiative is also linked with some sort of French 
paternalism for its former colonies. Unlike the British Empire, the French one always 
had a certain neo-colonialist approach to fostering its ideals of human rights. The 
overwhelming French presence in the central African region implies more than just 
altruistic humanitarian intentions (Abderramahne). For the smaller countries involved in 
EUFOR RCA such as the Estonians, the Finns, the Luxemburgers, the Poles and the 
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Romanians, this was also their opportunity be more involved in community action. For 
the Georgians troops, this is a way of showing their committed intentions of joining the 
Union and the strength that they can bring to it. These are not established reasons for 
intervention but possible ones. 
EUFOR RCA intervention was precise in its framework and aimed at a few 
objectives to be completed within six months after deployment. First of all, EUFOR 
RCA was to provide military relief and support to the MISCA and Opération Sangaris 
stabilization mission by occupying Bangui (EEAS Mission Description). Specifically, 
EUFOR RCA would run in parallel with those aforementioned operations that were 
having difficulties curbing the conflict by protecting the Bangui M’Poko Airport and 
securing PK3 and PK5 districts. Hundreds of thousands of Christian refugees set up 
camp near the airport and the military base there in order to stay away from the violence 
inflicted on their community by the Séléka and access humanitarian aid offered by 
Doctors Without Borders. PK3 and PK5 were the primarily Muslim areas of the capital 
victim to the violence of the Anti-Balaka.  By alleviating the duty of MISCA and the 
French in Bangui, EU forces allowed the French troops to move into Western parts of 
the country where discriminate acts of violence were ripping the population apart. 
EUFOR RCA’s second goal was to create a secure space for the transitional 
administration of Catherine Samba-Panza to re-establish a functional state capable of 
delivering services to the population (EEAS April 2014). They needed to demilitarize 
the capital and in particular the Séléka militias, train the CAR police force and the 
armed forces, patrol at all hours of the day and open up humanitarian access to the 
population in need (Tardy). The ultimate aim of the EU mission was to act as a 
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transitional force and hand over the situation to the United Nations peacekeeping 
mission MINUSCA (EEAS April 2014). The EU established that EUFOR RCA is part 
of the EU’s comprehensive approach to the many challenges of the Central African 
Republic “as a bridging operation facilitating the smooth build-up of MINUSCA. [It] 
contributes to helping ensure a secure environment in the CAR.” (Africa Defense Web) 
EUFOR RCA would have a limited mandate in time and space: six months in Bangui, 
its airport and the Muslim district. Its rules of engagement would be as large as possible 
as underlined by the UN Resolution 2134. It would secure the population by creating 
space for freedom of movement and engender the renewal of economic and social 
activities. A funding and exit strategy was clear in order to encompass all that was 
hoped for by initiating this intervention in the first place (Bruxelles 2).  
EUFOR RCA can be considered a successful operation, not in terms of 
achieving all its initial objectives but definitely in increasing security for the capital and 
balancing military and humanitarian values through its respect of human rights and 
impartial representation. Concretely, violence decreased and absolute social and 
political breakdown was avoided. The airport and the assigned districts were kept 
secure. The number of weapons and deaths diminished significantly. EcoBank in PK5 
and the police station reopened. National armed forces were trained and somewhat 
brought up to speed to prepare for the arrival of MINUSCA. EUFOR RCA troops 
earned the trust and appreciation of locals on both the Christian and Muslim side and 
were surprisingly popular for an international military presence. They were accountable 
and reliable as opposed to the French and African Union troops who were at times 
accused of stealing diamonds, dubious sexual enterprises and making profit by selling 
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bottled water (Libération). Coordination between the various European troops was 
smooth. EUFOR RCA stayed impartial in protecting civilians of both sides and faithful 
to the transitional administration. For the amount of resources available and scope of 
this mission, EUFOR RCA was relatively successful.  
EUFOR RCA was overall a well-designed mission with approachable and 
feasible objectives that were well-coordinated with the CAR government and other 
peacekeeping forces in the field. It balanced coherently the humanitarian and security 
components of its mission and even managed to establish a positive reputation for itself 
in the eyes of the capital’s inhabitants. The international authority granted to EUFOR 
RCA was wielded adroitly and President Samba-Panza was grateful for the support of 
the small European presence. 
2015 UN: MINUSCA 
In September 2014, MINUSCA, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the Central African Republic, arrived in the CAR to relay MISCA. Under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MINUSCA was in the CAR to fulfill the main mission 
of supporting the transitional government in rebuilding infrastructure. The specific 
MINUSCA mandate (UN MINUSCA) was to:  
- Protect civilians and UN personnel 
- Install equipment and security for the freedom of movement of 
UN and associated personnel 
- Support the political process and restoration of the State authority 
and its extension throughout the territory 
- Create secure conditions for assistance and the return of IDPs and 
refugees 
- Promote and protect of human rights 
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- Promote of dialogue, mediation and reconciliation at all levels 
- Support DDR 
Approximately 12,500 troops were authorized by the UNSC in March 2015. As of now, 
only about 10,000 troops are on the ground. The mission is fresh and on-going so 
evaluation of its effects might not be very pertinent and relevant.  
Despite this lack of information, MINUSCA still reveals a significant amount on 
the effectiveness of genocide prevention mechanisms. The PKO itself demonstrates that 
systems created to prevent genocide can be effective and timely. Transition of MISCA 
to MINUSCA was smooth and successful according to the UN observers and envoys to 
the CAR. Babacar Gaye, head of the new UN mission, and Herve Ladsous, Under 
Secretary General for the UN PKO, expressed appreciation for the “exemplary 
collaboration between the UN and the AU that enabled a seamless transfer of authority, 
including the re-hatting of as many MISCA contingents as possible, in accordance with 
UN standards.” (UN News Center “Central African Republic: Ban Welcomes” 2014). 
MINUSCA has tremendous potential for success because of its large capacity. It has 
previous successful cases such as UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone to learn from and it 
should not be encountering any significant obstacles in order to achieve its goals 
(Hinson). Depending on how the situation plays out in the coming year with elections in 
August 2015 and the end of the MINUSCA mission in April 2016, a better evaluation of 
MINUSCA should be done with this research project. 
Shortcomings of these missions 
Many strong and unfortunately accurate criticisms have been made about the 
effectiveness of MISCA, EUFOR RCA, Opération Sangaris and MINUSCA. Goals 
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have not been achieved 100%. There is no peace and there is no security if the 
evaluative criterion for this is the return of Muslim internally displaced peoples (IDPs) 
to Bangui. One fourth of the population in the CAR remains displaced (UNHCR). Civil 
services have not been completely restored. Peace is fragile since people are still dying 
and there are still instances of mass violence. Disorganization, miscommunication, 
waste of resources, lack of resources, bad coordination and lack of transparency are 
some of the many harsh feedbacks provided by ICRtoP in their April 2015 report. On 
top of this, recent accusations and allegations of sexual assault and child molestation in 
the past month directed at AU and French peacekeeping forces are extremely 
problematic and detrimental to the integrity of the mission and the institutions that 
supported them. This report seriously questions the accountability of troops in the field 
who may be retraumatizing victims. All the problems of these PKOs must be carefully 
documented in retrospect and justice must be applied to peacekeepers as they are 
applied in the country in which they are intervening. 
Criticisms undermining the effectiveness of PKOs will be made and will always 
be relevant and important. These will become even more visible as time goes by. 
Foreign humanitarian intervention will have unintended and unexpected consequences 
that the international community cannot account for. However, the scope of this study 
will not focus on the failures but rather point out again the few aspects in which 
genocide prevention mechanisms can and have bettered the situation in the CAR.  
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Success in the short run: elements that can be replicated for future prevention 
initiatives  
Experts tracking the conflict in the CAR have confirmed that peacekeeping 
forces have played an important role in reversing the cycle of violence in the CAR. 
Peter Bouckaert, a CAR expert for Human Rights Watch responded to Amanpour of 
CNN by highlighting the effectiveness of genocide prevention there:  
With the country in disrepair, Amanpour asked Peter Bouckaert would it 
have been any worse without the peacekeepers’ deployment several 
months go. ‘Absolutely,’ he told the program. ‘I think we need to 
understand that a Rwanda was averted in the Central African Republic, 
the kind of massacres we witnessed 20 years ago because of the presence 
of these peacekeepers.’ (Hullah) 
Peter Bouckaert’s response is echoed by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect. The Global Center for R2P’s evaluation of the CAR crisis which is the most 
current, has lowered the CAR from the status of current crisis to imminent crisis; the 
conflict is moving in the opposite direction and the potential for genocide has 
decreased.  
Potential for genocide in the CAR was identified and addressed by key 
international players rather than ignored or debated. Atrocity crimes were clearly 
defined and recognized. Samantha Power’s visit to Bangui in March 2013 indicated that 
the responsibility to protect the citizens of the CAR whether they be Muslim, Christian, 
farmers or nomads, would be of central importance to the international community. Ban 
Ki-Moon’s presence following Power’s reinforced this idea that the international 
community cared. International and universal responsibility for human life was one of 
Lemkin’s fundamental goals. Many will debate whether or not “genocide” was 
happening in the CAR and experts like, Louisa Lombard in Bloggingheads TV, said 
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that the use of the term “genocide” for the CAR was “irresponsible” (Bloggingheads 
TV Goldberg and Lombard). The reality is that the international community cannot wait 
until genocide takes place in order to intervene. The word “genocide” was 
conceptualized by Lemkin so that a reaction would be triggered in face of atrocity 
crimes. In a place like the CAR where the state is literally non-existent and completely 
impotent, the international community is responsible to stop and prevent genocide and 
the implosion of the country. The use of the word “genocide” triggered an accurate 
reaction from the international community.  
“Genocide” engendered reaction and more importantly, it led to prevention and 
the appeal to R2P through Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UNSC Resolution 2127 
allowing French and MISCA operations and UNSC Resolution 2149 authorizing 
MINUSCA are direct results of R2P and the UN Charter. Collaboration between 
different international players is highlighted and even encouraged by Resolution 2127. 
The resolution carefully articulated a comprehensive peacekeeping operation involving 
the AU, the EU and the UN. Despite criticism, this turned out to be relatively successful 
as mentioned in previous parts of this study. The design of the missions were based on 
the reforms taking place on all different continents and in the UN, as mentioned in the 
AU-UN’s 10 Year Capacity-Building Programme. Communication between the 
different players was never broken throughout the interventions since BINUCA relays 
information between the UN and the AU before the creation of MINUSCA. 
Furthermore, the PSC’s role was acknowledged and the responsibility of protection was 
framed in such a way that highlighted an African political solution to the conflict rather 
than a military one. The first few pages of Resolution 2127 focus on the Transitional 
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Authorities and their obligations to restore political stability. French and African troops 
are only mentioned in terms of support for DDR Programs and security. They do not 
bear the responsibility to protect but rather assist the transitional Central African 
government in doing so (S/RES/2127 6). Funding for MISCA will not be done through 
the UN but the African Peace Fund, which again, highlights the international 
community’s intention to allocate responsibility differently from the past (S/RES/2127 
7).  
The early warning response capability of the international community through 
European and African structures proved to be very effective. Capacity building 
essentially happened overnight. The international community elaborated a strategic 
policy formulation and delivery plan. The necessary security support to Central African 
nationals, humanitarian aid workers, government representatives and foreign nationals 
was guaranteed legally and concretely. Legal response mechanisms were also useful in 
supporting the transitional government that is destitute of any judicial system. The ICC 
opened investigation regarding crimes allegedly committed on CAR territory since 
August 2012. Recommendations of the UNSC resolution were clearly translated into 
concrete actions. 
In that same line of thought, Samantha Power, in her tool kit for genocide 
prevention, mentions the importance of immediate sanctions (Power 514). The 
international community was effective at implementing those that were necessary. The 
African Union froze Séléka assets abroad and the PSC instigated travel bans for Séléka 
leaders. The Kimberley Process on the ethics of the diamond market suspended the 
CAR (S/RES/2127) to limit growth of black markets that could rapidly degenerate in 
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this situation of anarchy. Power also emphasizes the need to provide robust and 
immediate technical, military and financial support for those who would be securing 
space and addressing basic needs of affected civilian populations. The international 
community promised immediate support in different ways: equipment (EU), troops 
(Africa and Europe), funding (United States), logistics (other players in the UN). The 
partnership between the EU, France and the AU MISCA exemplifies this. With the 
exception of MINUSCA that was enacted later on in fall 2014, all steps to prevent 
genocide were taken within a week to a month of the resolution passed in December 
2013. The transitional government of Catherine Samba-Panza was established by 
January 2014 only a month after the passing of Resolution 2127. The timeliness and 
promptness of genocide prevention in the CAR was adequate and played a significant 
role in actually curtailing the violence, the death and the breakdown of the country. This 
success matches the general trend of successful genocide prevention since end of the 
Cold War (Pinker 338). 
Other smaller but still significant successes of the international community also 
show how genocide prevention techniques and strategies have improved over time in 
terms of reinforcing democracy and rule of law for stability and peace in the long-run. 
The choice of backing Catherine Samba-Panza as leader of the transitional government 
in the CAR was an astute one. A female leader alters and nuances positions of power 
within the traditional male dominated establishments. The powers that be that placed 
her as a favored candidate in the parliamentary elections hoped that a woman’s 
leadership in the CAR would mirror the story of Liberia (Westwood). In an interview 
for Voice of America for Anne Look, the Executive Director for the NGO Women 
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Africa Solidarity, Oley Dibba-Wadda said: "There's a joke I read the other day - when 
everything gets messed up, the women are asked to come in and clean up.” Fred 
Swaniker in his TED talk said that “Africa would rise or fall because of the quality of 
our leaders” because the power of leaders matter in places with weak judicial 
institutions and a weak civil society. The support for Samba-Panza represents this 
productive and encouraging change. 
As the mayor of Bangui and the founder of an active and efficient female lawyer 
association in the CAR, Samba-Panza had a good grasp of the failures in the state and 
knew it well enough to navigate it adroitly. Furthermore, her cosmopolitan background 
(Chadian, Cameroonian, Central African) and her diverse professional experiences 
(lawyer, business woman, mayor) granted her the ability to act as a mediator between 
various groups in society. She could hear and see what others could not because of her 
gendered outlook on society.  Other candidates might have been more flexible to the 
demand of certain foreign powers but they all carried with them some sort of connection 
with the history of violence and impunity that Samba-Panza did not have (Vircoulon, 
“The Third Government”). In her inauguration speech, she was proactive in reaching for 
peace as she demanded that the Séléka and Anti-Balaka put down their arms. She 
promised to not run for upcoming presidential elections and would only be there to help 
with the transition. Furthermore, her cabinet respects parity and more women have been 
included in her government.  
Catherine Samba-Panza is not perfect. The point of this argument is not to put 
her on a pedestal but rather to emphasize how the international community is actively 
trying to pursue new values by including gender equality into consideration. 
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Acknowledging gender equality for better democracy was also taken into account in 
working groups of the AU and the UN:  
“On the situation of women in the CAR, Mlambo-Ngcuka will update 
members on her 24-26 May joint mission to the CAR with AU Special 
Envoy for Women, Peace and Security Bineta Diop. Mlambo-Ngcuka 
and Diop met with transitional President Catherine Samba-Panza, Prime 
Minister Andre Nzapayeke, Special Representative Gaye, religious 
leaders and members of civil society, including the High-Level Women’s 
Advisory Group […] She is expected to convey recommendations for a 
gender architecture for MINUSCA which would cover the function, 
placement and reporting lines of women protection advisers and gender 
advisers within the mission.” (What’s In Blue, “Dispatches from the 
Field,” 2015).  
Council members who visited Bria in early 2015 were also very impressed by the work 
of youth and women NGO representatives for the Committee for Awareness Raising 
who bring together Muslim and Christian communities to talk about tensions. The 
process of genocide prevention in the CAR tried to engage the silent majority, shifted 
power dynamics through a strong grounding in rule of law. Genocide prevention in the 
CAR demonstrates that measures for prevention are changing and will change to 
include a larger scope of understanding peace and stability.  
Why was success possible?  
Successful genocide prevention in the CAR was possible because the 
international community reacted in a timely manner but also because certain inherent 
and specificities of the particular Central African situation made it possible for the 
PKOs to be effective. Within weeks of the official declaration of genocide in the CAR 
at the UNSC, the AU and the French were active in the field. This was in part possible 
because the French have three military bases in the region which makes movement 
much easier than it would or may in another region of the world (in the Middle East for 
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example). This significantly improved the international community’s capacity to 
actually enforce their promises.  
The CAR also has a specific environment that made it possible for intervention 
and prevention to be effective in the short run. First of all, there was no actual resistance 
to foreign intervention because there was no sovereign state to be threatened in the first 
place. All leaders preceding Samba-Panza had taken power illegally and without official 
popular support. Unlike many other places where PKOs have taken place, the 
international community did not have the “sovereignty” obstacle presented to them. The 
absence of a security apparatus and the non-existent state facilitated genocide 
prevention at least at the strategic level. The international community essentially had 
carte blanche for intervention and few could argue against it. There was no resistance at 
the national level but there was no resistance from the international level either.  
France and Chad who were on the UNSC backed an initiative for genocide 
prevention and no permanent member showed any thorough resistance to the referral to 
R2P and the use of Chapter VII. Political implications of intervention seemed harmless. 
No state would be significantly upset by foreign presence in the CAR. In fact, foreign 
presence was more than welcome by neighboring countries and regional powers. The 
risk of conflict spillover and the consequences of the power vacuum left by Djotodia’s 
absence were more dangerous and threatening than a breach of sovereignty at this point. 
The economic implications of the collapse of the CAR were also quite terrifying. The 
consequences of non-intervention largely outweighed potential unintended 
consequences of intervention. This seemed obvious to everyone and in particular to the 
CAR’s neighboring country, Chad, that has had to deal with instability in the CAR 
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many times. The influence of the UNSC cannot be underestimated. For example, their 
position towards intervention in Mali that was happening at the same time was much 
more reticent than it was for the CAR. This reticence highlights many underlying causes 
of why genocide prevention was possible in the CAR.   
The international community for the crisis of the CAR also had comparative 
advantage. Gaye explained in his interview with the UN Radio that:  
We are going to have on the ground all the comparative advantages of a 
UN peacekeeping mission,” said Mr. Gaye, noting specifically 
predictable and sustainable financial resources for the Mission, years of 
experience in the field of peacekeeping, and the comprehensive approach 
that the United Nations has been implementing, which is now recognized 
as an area where it is ahead of regional organizations.” (“Central African 
Republic: Ban Welcomes”)  
Gaye underlines a final and important point: in 2015, the UN and the international 
community have had multiple experiences with genocide prevention and they have 
created all the necessary tools to actually prevent it. Lessons have been learned from 
past instances. They cannot allow themselves further mistakes since they no longer have 
the excuse of uncertainty or inexperience. The CAR is essentially a blank slate for the 
international community to actually do well and it has proved that it really can be 
effective in implementing and using all the tools necessary for genocide prevention. 
Effective genocide prevention is possible if the international community works together 
coherently. However, this does not mean that genocide prevention is sufficient where it 
is at right now in the CAR. Many improvements can still be made but it is less by 
creating new tools than by shifting the way we understand, analyze and frame conflict.  
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Enlarging Genocide Prevention: the political and the cultural  
Eight months after deployment of MINUSCA troops, the UNSC reflects on the 
fact that progress has been limited and the situation on the ground remains volatile 
(What’s in Blue, “Renewal of CAR Mission Mandate,” 2015; Nawoyski; UNSC 
Resolution 2217). Physical violence may have subsided significantly but humanitarian 
conditions are calamitous and worsen day by day. Open air conflict is no longer the 
main issue but crime, vandalism, banditry, terrorism, hunger and disease are. Many 
Muslim IDPs cannot return to their homes and many are still confined to enclaves 
throughout the country. A quarter of the country is displaced. Hundreds and thousands 
have fled to Cameroon and Chad (HRW “Unseen War” 2014) The economy is 
dilapidated and without jobs, the prospects of Central Africans returning to a normal life 
seem discouraging. The challenge at hand to prevent genocide in the long run is the 
reconstruction and rebuilding of the country. The hope of the international community 
is that stability will hold at least longer than it did the last time in 2010. A similar 
example that the Central Africans should avoid would be Burundi. Burundi today is a 
bleak example of why it is necessary to think of genocide prevention as a long-term 
project from the start of intervention. In order to achieve this, structural, institutional, 
political and cultural impediments to peace must be addressed effectively.  
Genocide prevention is more than “saving lives”. If prevention was only to save 
lives, then troops and advisors in the CAR could return home now. The genocide 
prevention equation needs incorporate more factors than ones of morality, ethics and 
justice which are all often debatable. Politics, economics, sociology, geography all need 
to be taken into consideration. Efforts to save lives today would be meaningless if those 
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same lives were to be lost to dire humanitarian circumstances later. The framework 
through which we understand genocide prevention needs to be enlarged to a wider 
context and include more components in order to be sustainably effective. In the CAR 
today, grenades are cheaper than cans of coke (Harding). Diamond trade and poaching 
continue to fuel rebel groups. Farmlands on which many Central Africans depend have 
not been restored, the central urban hubs of the CAR are stabilized but the peripheries 
are still dying due to direct violence itself but also due to the secondary effects on 
conflict on society. Deforestation has pushed the pygmy nomads into unlivable 
circumstances and this will have undeniable complicated consequences on Central 
African demographics and social organizations in the future.  
R2P, the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention and all other existent tools 
aforementioned can prevent genocide in the sense that these measures can halt and stop 
the progress of atrocity crimes temporarily. However, these international instruments do 
not effectively prevent genocide in the long-run. The fundamental issue is that despite 
the usefulness of these implicit and explicit agreements, there is no global consensus on 
a systematic understanding of peace. There is somewhat of a common understanding in 
the international community of what “genocide” looks like thanks to Lemkin’s work on 
the Genocide Convention but no similar concept or direction on the notion of “peace”.  
The peace, for which the UN stood, was, therefore, primarily a negative 
peace, characterized by the absence of war. The additional task of 
establishing a positive peace, understood as the establishment of the 
preconditions that would make outbreak of wars less likely due to their 
ethical unacceptability or unreasonableness, came second and by some 
distance (McDoom 583).  
There is no common vision of peace within the international community. What peace 
truly means or embodies is unknown and undefined apart from the fact that it is a 
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negative or an opposition to war and genocide. In December 2014, the 15 members of 
the UNSC easily unanimously agreed to the resolutions 2127 and 2149 preventing 
genocide in the CAR through the deployment of AU, EU, French and UN troops. For 
resolution 2217 of April 2015 on the renewed role of UN peacekeeping in the extended 
MINUSCA operations in the CAR, it was more difficult to gain the same overall 
approval4. The brief of What’s in Blue on the renewal of the CAR MINUSCA mission 
gives insight on why there difficulty stemmed from:  
“China, with the support of Russia, wanted to limit the proposed 
language on the role of MINUSCA with respect to forcefully seizing and 
destroying weapons and ammunitions. In their view, the mission’s 
mandate is to support the management and security of the CAR’s 
disarmament efforts once a strategy is put in place. France, with the 
support of the US and the UK, favoured explicit language for MINUSCA 
to forcefully disarm armed groups as part of its protection of civilians 
mandate. Several countries, while agreeing on the need to seize and 
destroy illegal stockpiles of munitions as an urgent priority of the 
mission, found the P3 proposal too robust. The compromise text 
suggested calls on MINUSCA to actively seize and destroy weapons of 
armed elements, without a specific reference to the use of force.” 
What does a “too robust” of a proposal mean? Why is it less contentious to call for a 
robust proposal to save lives than to destroy the weapons that kill the lives in the first 
place? The two questions are inseparable for effective genocide prevention. Although 
the negotiations were not highly contentious, the disagreements still highlight the fact 
that the path to peace is ambiguous for the international community. Peace does not 
have to be defined the way genocide is. If it were, the world would be reverted back to a 
1984 Orwellian situation. Peace is a cultural, political, social vision and ideal that 
evolves with time and with human beings. Louisa Lombard recounts part of her trip to 
the CAR in her article:                                                          4 UNSC Resolution 2217 passed only a few weeks ago and I could not find the voting details for this. 
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“I often think of a rebel officer and children’s rights advocate known as 
Colonel Tarzan whom I met in Tiringoulou in 2009. ‘Sometimes I ask 
myself why I was born here,’ he once said. ‘The C.A.R. sure is a bizarre 
place.’ It is that bizarreness, not idealized templates, that peace-building 
must take as its starting point.” (Lombard, “Making War Not Peace,” 
2014)  
In order to prevent genocide effectively, tools for genocide prevention must address this 
ambiguity: this “bizarreness”. 
Genocide prevention based on ethical and moral premises 
In A Problem From Hell, Samantha Power argues that the main reason why the 
United States (and the international community) should intervene to stop genocide is a 
moral one (Power 512) yet this specific argument is not an effective argument for 
prevention. In fact, it may be the least effective one and sometimes even 
counterproductive. Power writes about John Fox desperately trying to stir action in the 
State department to prevent genocide in Bosnia. The response that others gave him was: 
“[This moral argument] is an argument you almost never make in government if you 
know what you are doing. It virtually guarantees that you don’t get invited to the next 
meeting and that you gain a reputation for moralism.” (Power 267). On the political 
level, the argument of doing what is right in the face of genocide is weak. It has no 
political grip. The moral argument does not trigger government action essentially 
because political institutions are not moral beings the way human beings are 
themselves. The state does not do things because they are right; they do them for the 
good of the greatest majority of their constituencies. “When multiple objectives are 
under consideration, highly regarded humanitarian values essentially collapse in the 
competition with national security and economic security objectives.” (Slovic, Gregory, 
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Frank and Vastfjall) States make decisions based on an objective; the morality of the 
action will be ethically considered in light of that objective. Ideally, what states do and 
what they should do match. However, the reality is that states rarely do what they 
should do5. Those who research behavior and psychology in relation to genocide show 
that choice of action are rarely consistent with expressed values. There is a “prominence 
effect” where decisions at the governmental level are focused on the most “prominent” 
issue at hand: national security and national interests. People and states seek to satisfy 
their need for safety and security first which often then devalues efforts to intervene in 
massive humanitarian crises (Slovic, Gregory, Frank and Vastfjall 2014). A similar idea 
is advanced in economics: rational agents behave according to self-interest. The state is 
a rational agent and thus its actions follow the economic law. Core national security, 
despite what President Obama may say, does not always go hand in hand with core 
moral responsibility. Politics and economics take precedence over the moral argument 
and blurs the sense of what should be done.  There can be no moral judgment on this 
fact because, in part, we all find it quite normal and necessary that, if given the choice 
to choose, the state is more concerned with our well-being than that of unknown people 
in faraway lands who have nothing to do with us. Consequently, the framework with 
which the international community approaches genocide prevention cannot be limited to 
the moral argument. Doing what is right should be the reason for which prevention 
takes place but the reality is that it needs to encompass much more than that because it 
is oftentimes more nuanced than simple altruism.  
                                                        5 What exactly the term “should” means can again be debatable at length. 
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On the individual level too, the moral argument for genocide prevention is less 
effective than it would seem to be. Individuals struggle to understand the scope and 
implications of genocide. It is not that people refuse to react and to do the right thing; 
they psychologically cannot compute the meaning of genocide. “The more the victims, 
the less compassion.” (Kristof, “Save the Darfur Puppy,” 2007) People struggle to 
appreciate the value of lives lost. Slovic and Västfjäll’s study on psychic numbing 
disproves the assumption that people can understand implications of numbers and act on 
them accordingly. The underlying issue is that feelings are pitted against logic. The 
rational answer to genocide is to prevent it. Acting morally to atrocity crimes is the 
logical response but that is not the “natural” response. The automatic response to 
genocide concerns affects and feelings. This is due to a biological instinct and intuition 
of survival. “Compared to analysis, reliance on feelings tends to be a quicker, easier, 
and more efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain, and dangerous world. 
Hence, it is essential to rational behavior. Yet it sometimes misleads us.” (Slovic & 
Västfjäll) Numbers and statistics on certain human tragedies like genocide lack any 
affect or feeling so “as a result, they fail to convey the true meaning of such calamities 
and they fail to motivate proper action to prevent them.” (Slovic & Västfjäll) Current 
models of decision-making like R2P fail to take this into account. The responsibility to 
protect in the context of genocide is not a natural international instinct. What is 
intuitive, however, is to react to “puppies”: emotional stimulation and the power of a 
single story because these touch on feelings. “Feelings necessary for motivating 
lifesaving actions are not congruent with the normative/rational models […] Our 
capacity to feel is limited.’” (Slovic & Västfjäll) Darfur is the example used nowadays 
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to highlight the failure to prevent genocide despite the massive advertisement 
campaigns led to raise awareness on the issue. The CAR on the other hand had 
relatively low media coverage yet intervention took place swiftly to address the 
spiraling of violence there. This contrast between Darfur and the CAR shows that the 
moral argument is not applicable in all circumstances. In both cases, atrocity crimes are 
committed yet they are not addressed the same way. Many different factors play a role 
in this decision-making in addition to the psychological one. Rational genocide 
prevention may be less based on morals than it is on something else. This “bizarreness” 
and this disconnect must be considered in genocide prevention. Slovic proposes that 
when “our moral intuitions fail us […] one way of addressing that is to change the way 
we frame information.” (Slovic, “Why People Do Not React to Genocide,’ 2014) Fast-
thinking connected with feelings is the way we respond to genocide yet it is important 
to take slow-thinking, a mode of thinking that is more logical and more holistic, when 
addressing genocide so that we may have a more adequate response to it. We can frame 
information through innovative and dynamic education. We can also do that by 
approaching genocide prevention in a non-moral way.  
An amoral or non-moral genocide prevention framework 
The moral framework of genocide prevention is fundamental in provoking 
action and foreign intervention to stop atrocity crimes but it is weak in terms of 
sustaining the genocide prevention initiatives. This issue leads to a larger conversation 
on how genocide prevention may be more effective in a durable manner by not only 
saving lives but by sustaining them. “Properly used, force can offer physical protection 
to populations in immediate danger. But it cannot compel the parties to build 
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sustainable peace; rebuild shattered governments, economies, and societies; protect 
populations in the long term; or provide comprehensive security” (Bellamy 598). So 
what is the next step after genocide has been averted like in the CAR? The situation is 
still fragile and volatile, so how can the international community actually and actively 
prevent genocide? Mepham and Ramsbotham frame this issue in a succinct way: “The 
central challenge today in respect of the responsibility to protect in Africa (and in other 
parts of the world) is not normative but operational: how to actually protect civilians 
from mass killing, war crimes and genocide” (Mepham & Ramsbotham 9). In order to 
address this operational challenge, the international community must incorporate a more 
pragmatic approach to genocide prevention.   
Today, the rebuilding of the CAR goes off the premise of how politics, again, 
should work rather than how they actually work (Lombard, “Making War Not Peace”). 
The French ambassador to the UN, Gerard Arnaud, said that we needed to restore law 
and order (Farry) but the reality was that there was no law and order to begin with. 
There have been numerous peace-building initiatives in the CAR but these may fail 
once again if the international community does not adopt a larger framework of analysis 
when undertaking genocide prevention. Larger issues underling the conflict need to be 
dealt with not because they should be dealt with for moral purposes but because they 
need to be for pragmatic reasons. A non-moral framework for genocide prevention is 
not forcibly condemnable since it may lead to a better grasp on the problems at hand 
and may even lead to beneficial results. “Actions that produce humanitarian good 
should not be condemned because they are not inspired by humanitarian motives. The 
key test should be that the means chosen by the intervener must not undermine the 
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positive humanitarian outcome” (Bellamy 609). By focusing on the moral argument 
against genocide, the international community releases itself from the responsibilities of 
actually dealing with the root causes of genocide and provides itself with an excuse to 
again intervene abroad in the future. “By insisting that interveners be guided by purely 
humanitarian motives, the bar is placed so high that no military measures will remedy 
human suffering” (Bellamy 608). Violence repeats itself in cycles and is never 
transformed into a positive energy. The French have intervened in the CAR multiple 
times yet not significant development change has taken place.  The task at hand of 
fostering peace after averting genocide seems so overwhelming yet the rebuilding of 
peace is an extension of genocide prevention. In fact, it is an inherent part of it. Mark 
Levene when looking at the future of genocide prevention in the 21st century explains 
that: “to speak of an event as genocide is almost ipso facto to repudiate the possibility 
that it might have been shaped or determined by factors or circumstances associated 
with politics, economics, or social or cultural behavior of dominant international 
society” (Levene 639) so it is important for the international community to include all 
those components when attempting to prevent genocide.  
Genocide as a form of war: degenerate war 
As shown before, because human minds have a hard time conceptualizing the 
meaning of genocide and its impact on humanity, it is important to start from the basis 
that genocide is not something exceptional in itself. The outcomes of genocide are 
aberrant and extra-ordinary but the phenomenon itself should be considered as conflict 
like any other. Prolonged discussions on the semantics of the word “genocide” veer the 
conversation away from what is actually happening on the ground. Conceptual and 
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abstract conversations on the meaning of the word “genocide” undermine effective 
genocide prevention. To coherently prevent genocide and the re-eruption of violent 
conflict in the CAR, one must consider genocide as a process of war. War is a period of 
violence fighting between groups. It does not imply that the two sides are equal in 
power or status nor that they are both willing to fight. In this sense, genocide fits the 
category of war. Martin Shaw argues that genocide is a form of degenerate war. 
Destruction of the enemy implies “destroying the social power of a particular group – in 
economic and cultural as well as political senses – usually to eliminate or drastically 
reduce its presence in a particular territory. Destroying the target group’s power also 
involves destroying its ability to resist.” (Shaw, “Genocide as a Form of War,” 86) 
Some may consider genocide the “worst” of wars or conflict but the fact remains that 
genocide is not an inexplicable act of barbarity and bestiality (Straus, “Political Science 
and Genocide,” 177).  There are certain aspects of the Central African culture that may 
seem archaic and ignorant but the violent tearing apart of the CAR in 2012 was 
predictable (Lombard, “Making War Not Peace,”; Lombard & Batianga-Kinzi 20).  
There is logic behind all conflicts. Genocide does not appear out of nowhere and 
simply because mass media has not publicized it does not mean that conflict never 
existed before. “The study of war on the continent should take the everyday uses and 
meanings of violence as a starting point, rather than assuming that the period prior to 
the outbreak of war was free of violence.” (Lombard & Batianga-Kinzi 20)  There have 
been 7 French interventions in the CAR: conflict resolution simply is not working. 
Previous attempts to prevent conflict in the CAR have been effective in the short run 
but clearly inadequate from the results today. For Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi who 
 
 
84  
have studied the CAR extensively, “war is a social project and must be understood in 
that broader social context, which in the CAR includes pervasive violent popular 
punishment. [,,,]War does not erase the social and cultural patterns existing in the places 
where it occurs, but rather transforms and adapts them” (Lombard & Batianga-Kinzi 2-
3) Layers of history, politics and economic dysfunction built up to the crisis today. 
Conflict is rarely resolved but rather, it is transformed. Martin Shaw discusses genocide 
not as a social action committed by perpetrators but as “a structure of conflict between 
actors” (Shaw, “Sociology and Genocide,” 159). Extreme violence is not singular, it is a 
product and a step of a larger social problem that is not being addressed. War may not 
be avoided but “we may still hope to be able to reduce the danger of war for long 
stretches of time, to avoid particular wars, to pursue policies that make a satisfactory 
peace more likely and more lasting.” (Kagan 566) In order to prevent war, the 
international community must take into account the context of the conflict and the root 
causes of the potential of genocide. If this is ignored then any prospect for stability, 
peace and security will be founded on a weak, empty and corrupt rotting base.  
Economic dimension: scarce resources and decision-making 
Genocide prevention should be an imperative but often times there is little 
incentive to stop conflict for those who profit from it. Conflict fuels life. How can the 
situation be stable enough if everyone has easy access to weapons, if weapons are 
cheaper than food and if there is nothing easier than to kill with no repercussions 
whatsoever?  Lombard in her trips to the CAR in 2009 and 2010 interviewed a few of 
the young Séléka:  
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I spoke with fighters in Tiringoulou and Kaga Bandoro, remote towns 
now claimed by Séléka, about why they’d taken up arms. Their 
responses fell into three categories: government forces had attacked their 
people; the government had failed to provide roads, schools and health 
clinics; they were poor, and if they became rebels they might obtain 
something from disarmament programs, maybe even government jobs. 
They fought the government less to overturn it than to get something for 
themselves (Lombard, “Making War Not Peace”).  
The current framework for genocide prevention addresses the first reason why the 
Séléka took up arms. It undertakes one out of the three main issues of the spiraling 
violence but the volatility of the situation in the CAR today demonstrates that focusing 
on the first point is simply not enough. Although economics are rarely addressed in 
conflict resolution, economic relationships are crucial to enacting genocide prevention 
in the long run. Economic and development initiatives are often put aside for 
development agencies and international monetary institutions after stabilization of the 
crisis but this is problematic since poverty, development and conflict are inherently 
linked. The international community may save lives but if those lives cannot survive on 
their own than the whole enterprise is incomplete and insufficient. Without jobs, 
without the means to sustain their own lives, many will resort to violence since there is 
nothing to lose and nothing to save. In the Western world, education programs keep 
children off the streets. Social activities and community support systems keep youth 
away from joining gangs as a way of living. The international community is able to 
provide opportunities and incentives in a similar way. Incentives, and in particular 
economic ones, drive states and individuals to prevent genocide as opposed to moral 
arguments. Similarly, incentives must be provided to stop Central Africans from taking 
up arms.  
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Failure to address economic players in genocide prevention really undermines 
the objective itself. Elephant poaching in the CAR creates conflicts of its own which 
only enhance the already existent divide between the communities in the CAR. 
Violence related to poaching activities is interwined with the grievances of the Séléka 
and the Anti-Balaka.  As disconnected as it may seem, human beings die by hundreds 
because of the poaching (Lombard, “Dying for Ivory”). 
Since the 1980s, under the mantle of conservation efforts and with 
funding from the European Union, governments, NGOs and private 
associations, African park guards have fought a rarely discussed low-
level war against poachers. The conflict is becoming increasingly 
militarized, with both poachers and anti-poachers each justifying their 
belligerence as a response to the others. (Lombard, “Dying for Ivory”).  
There is little incentive for poachers and anti-poachers to do things differently since 
they profit from this conflict. Ivory is sold no matter what the political situation is. 
Neighboring countries also profit from conflict in the CAR because the abundance of 
natural resources are liberated.  Diamond exports account for 51% of the CAR’s export 
earnings according to the Minister of Ecology and with the country in shambles, anyone 
and everyone and come into the country and take advantage of abandoned resources. 
For Séléka militias, control of diamond production was a key grievance 
against Bozize, who in 2008 sought to create a monopoly over the 
domestic market for his relatives and members of his ethnic group, 
according to the International Crisis Group, a Belgian-based think-tank. 
In May 2013, as the Séléka took control of Bangui, Kimberley Process 
regulators banned CAR diamonds from world markets, an attempt to 
keep the gems from fueling further violence. But illegal export networks 
proliferated, as many of the Muslim buyers fled to neighboring countries 
such as Cameroon and continued overseeing export routes (Eckel & 
Bagassi). 
The illegal commerce of diamonds creates a whole other black market for more toxic 
and dangerous commodities such as light arms (pouring in from Sudan and the DRC). 
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With little to no supervision of business dealings in the CAR, the country becomes an 
ideal economic haven for illegal traffickers of anything and everything.  
The argument here is not to make genocide prevention into development aid 
programs but rather to highlight the interconnectedness of genocide prevention and 
economics that is often left out of the conversation and the framework of analysis for 
conflict management. Development aid needs to become part of genocide prevention 
initiatives. Organizations leave the country in crisis when they are the most needed. 
International Crisis Group which has carefully documented the evolution of economic 
breakdown into the outbreak of war states: 
The economy fell apart even before the state; yet the current 
international intervention spearheaded by the G5 (African Union, UN, 
European Union, the U.S. and France) focuses for the most part on 
security. Troops are being mobilised, but if a principal cause of the 
conflict – entrenched predation – is left unaddressed, the international 
community will repeat the failures of its past interventions. Protecting 
citizens is important; but so too is rekindling economic activity and 
improving financial public management to help build an effective public 
governance system delivering services for all CAR citizens, both Muslim 
and Christian (“The Central African Crisis”). 
Economics must be taken into consideration when thinking of genocide otherwise the 
international community finds itself in a situation. The UN Office of the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide is currently coordinating the possibility of future 
initiatives with international financial institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. The future of genocide prevention may look very 
different if joint programs can be developed. It would also be beneficial to reach out to 
corporations and companies who can also leverage economic incentives to stop war and 
genocide. Furthermore, if these initiatives were to take place, the international 
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community would have to keep excellent track of its money how it is used in order to 
avoid enhancing the conflict.  
Culture and history 
Lemkin himself understood genocide to be inseparable from culture. Although 
culture is not included in the definition of genocide as established by the Genocide 
Convention, it should still be included in genocide prevention framework because is it 
the basic building block of dismantling structures of violence in the CAR. Lemkin said: 
“Genocide has two phases: one the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed 
group, the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor.” (Lemkin 79) 
In colonizing the CAR and by imposing their way of life, the French annihilated the 
traditional cultures and structures of justice in Central African society. Similar to the 
Holocaust, the sort of epitome of genocide, the crisis in the CAR has its roots in 
imperialism, capitalism, bureaucracy and nationalism (Lemkin; Arendt)  
To overcome the Africans’ reluctance and to integrate them into a 
‘modern’ European economic system, the imperial conquerors embarked 
on the strategy of eliminating the indigenous populations’ economic 
independence. This objective effectively required the destruction of 
traditional cultures and ways of life (Schaller 361).  
The legacy of colonialism shapes the way violence is perceived and the role it plays in 
organizing power in the CAR. Colonialism established violence as the normal and 
acceptable means to gain power, to express dissatisfaction and to restore justice. 
Violence over time becomes a norm of education and punishment. It was popularized 
by leaders like King Leopold II. The French ruled Ubangi-Shari ruthlessly with total 
disregard for the life of Central Africans. The violence with which they enslaved the 
whole region lingered in the Central African history. For centuries, there was no system 
 
 
89  
of justice in the CAR – at least not one that worked the Western way. Extra-judicial 
recourse to violence was the form of popular justice that made up for the lack of 
institutionalized justice. Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi write a very insightful paper on 
how  
“the deliquescence of the CAR state over the past several decades was 
accompanied by the popularization of punishment and the entrenchment 
of vengeance as a tool for the management of threats. […] popular 
punishment on levels from the family to those of the crowd and 
neighbourhood, and argue that a climate of widely participatory violent 
vigilantism existed before the war.” (Lombard & Batianga-Kinzi 2)  
Because Central Africans could not count on the state to be representative of a social 
contract and agreement on justice, they took matters in their own hands using what 
history indicated was right: violence. Consequently, extreme violence as a form of 
justice was integrated into Central African culture.  
After independence, nothing fundamentally changed since there was “minimal 
post-colonial” reform as Mamdani would say. The French simply left leaving no 
guidance or base to build on for village chiefs except the memories of how things were 
and how they seemed to work. State norms in the CAR had and still have no legitimacy 
and credibility. “Extra-judicial or privatized means for resolving disputes remained 
prevalent. Heads of state, uncertain of whom they could trust, used extra-judicial 
execution to deal with the threats they perceived themselves as facing.” (Lombard & 
Batianga-Kinzi 8) Economic, political, legal and religious treatment of Central Africans 
combined to influence future patterns of mass intergroup violence in the CAR (Schaller 
363). De Waal explains that by seeking to radically transform their states through 
revolution, some African states may end up “replicating and intensifying the patterns of 
violence they inherited.” (De Waal 529). Extreme violence and genocide in the CAR 
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inherited from French colonialists are entrenched in the local Central African system of 
justice. 
 The international community in genocide prevention limited violence by 
disarming rebel groups and constricting access to weapons but this technique only 
disenfranchises the most disadvantaged in society and essentially grazes the issue of 
violence embedded in the Central African culture. Looking at genocide prevention with 
a historical understanding of violence and its cultural intricacies would allow the 
international community to be more effective and discerning in its strategies to address 
it. This does not mean that the UNSC must find ways to recreate a norm of justice but it 
implies that for sustainable peace and security in the CAR, violence needs to be 
considered not only in physical terms but also culturally and historically.  
Democracy and Human Rights 
Genocide prevention today is a package that includes different sanctions, 
democracy and elections, human rights, humanitarian aid and, if necessary, military 
intervention. This is effective as demonstrated in the slight political readjustment of the 
Central African transitional government but this is not sustainable because it is removed 
from the reality of the average Central African. Human rights, democracy, peace and 
justice are empty concepts for Central Africans who feel completely powerless in 
shaping their own lives. People do not have ownership of those concepts and thus 
cannot comprehend what they actually mean or represent. “The importance of human 
rights for democratic politics, is that rights cannot be dissociated from the awareness of 
rights” (Branch 241). The name of Séléka militias highlights this problem. The Popular 
Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD), the Convention of Patriots for Justice 
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and Peace (CPJP) and the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UDFU) were the 
three major rebel groups under the Séléka alliance. Their names embody these foreign 
concepts but the rebels know that there is a certain power to those words. Despite these 
denominations, all of these rebel groups are known for their use of child soldiers, their 
resort to rape and murder as a strategy of war and their brutalization of civilian 
populations. The average citizen struggles to understand how groups that defend peace, 
justice and democracy commit atrocity crimes. Under the assumption that even if these 
groups do uphold these notions, it is difficult for the Central Africans to reconcile the 
drastic incoherence between the actions of the rebel groups and the discourse of the 
international community.  
Democracy and human rights thus are somewhat meaningless. Central Africans 
need to frame their own understanding of rights and democracy: “rights as being 
fulfilled through an external agency, not through the organization and action of the 
rights-holders themselves” (Branch 7). The current model of genocide prevention 
provides the package but does not teach those affected by these notions what they 
actually mean and how they can use it to gain control of certain social power. Genocide 
prevention needs to acknowledge the distortion of the notion of human rights and 
democracy; otherwise it is completely ineffective in its objectives of fostering a more 
stable future in the CAR. 
Not only is this discourse ineffective but the discourse of human rights and 
democracy can even be harmful to those who must be protected. Hannah Arendt, most 
famous for her work on “the banality of evil” in the 20th century and the rise of 
totalitarianism in Europe, discusses the problem of using “human rights” in terms of 
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genocide prevention and advocacy. Human rights are considered elementary and basic 
rights of human beings yet having to resort to these inalienable rights actually highlights 
and enhances the status of victimhood in a situation of genocide (Arendt 292). She 
explains that “[the Jews] were and appeared to be nothing but human beings whose very 
innocence – was their greatest misfortune. Innocence, in the sense of complete lack of 
responsibility, was the mark of their rightlessness as it was the seal of their loss of 
political status.” (Arendt 295). The fundamental violence in the violation of human 
rights is not that you take freedom away from certain individuals but that you take away 
the possibility of fighting for freedom (Arendt 297). Central Africans, Muslims and 
Christians, peasant and businessmen, farmers and nomads were denied their human 
rights throughout the conflict as they saw the things and people they cherished the most 
broken and burned to ashes with no way of fighting back. When foreigners come with 
the good intention of preventing genocide and saving their lives by imposing the rule of 
law, democracy and the use of human rights, Central Africans are again “re-
traumatized” and deprived of their rights and ability to determine their political future in 
the way they see fit.  
Despite the fact that they now have a stable government and that the rebel 
leaders have decided to drop their weapons, Central Africans are still deprived of their 
agency because democracy, human rights and rule of law do not empower them the way 
the international community would hope they would. Branch explains that “by 
demanding their rights, people are not only demanding the space in which they will be 
able to enjoy these freedoms, but, in the very act of making those demands, they are 
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doing what is to be guaranteed by the right itself.” (Arendt 242) This process was not 
guaranteed for Central Africans.  
The international community through the admirable efforts of R2P cannot 
guarantee their essential human rights as citizens of the CAR despite all their efforts. 
The problem is that “this new situation in which ‘humanity’ has in effect assumed the 
role formerly ascribed to nature or history, would mean in this context that the right to 
have rights, or of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by 
humanity itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible.” (Arendt 298) 
Victims of genocide are deprived of human rights but also reduced to that “nakedness of 
being human” when they are not citizens or cannot fulfil their duties as citizens. The 
international community put Bangui back on its feet but through a top down approach 
rather than giving voice and power to those who would be subject to its authority.   
Arendt’s understanding of the detrimental effect of human rights is particularly 
applicable in Africa. Adam Branch who has worked in Uganda explains that:  
The West’s dominant image of Africa, despite its pretense of equality, 
entails a basic inequality: whereas African are mere humans and unable 
to raise themselves out of that denuded state, we in the West give 
ourselves the privileged position of both being able to identify with 
suffering Africans on the basis of a common humanity while also being 
able to go beyond mere human and re-assume our political, social, and 
economic personalities as globally powerful, responsible redeemers 
(Branch 5). 
Genocide intervention based on this dual moral claim to protect humanity itself while 
also protecting the actual African victim (Branch 6) can be compared to a sort of 
recolonization of Europe through moral premises. This evidently is not the goal of the 
international community in particular in the case of the CAR. Without foreign support 
to the African Union mission, any hope of life in the CAR would have been impossible 
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for many. However, in all interventions, there are unintended consequences and it 
would be important for future missions to take this into account. 
 Lemkin’s law, R2P, the new peace and security structures of the African Union, 
the European Common Security and Defense Policy demonstrate the huge progress that 
has been achieved in preventing genocide. The collaboration of the international 
community in creating mechanisms to overcome the natural instinct of not reacting to 
genocide would have been unthinkable only 50 years ago. Levene agrees but 
emphasizes however that “by contrast, we have posed that without firm grip on the 
understanding of the driving forces which determine the wider formation and 
organization of our present international system, implementation of the convention will 
not only remain piecemeal and inadequate but will be rapidly overtaken by forces which 
render its fragile efficacy null and void.” (Levene 658). Without taking away what we 
have already built in just the past two decades, this study suggests that we continue to 
enlarge the framework through which we understand genocide prevention and create a 
more holistic and nuanced approach in the interventions that we undertake while trying 
to do what we should do.  
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Conclusion  
The handling of the CAR crisis by the international community proves that 
genocide prevention today is realistic because the tools created during the 20th century 
and early 2000s have made it possible for the international community to take concrete 
initiative in a rapid and timely manner. All the existent legal, political, economic and 
social mechanisms and systems are functional and can be applied effectively as seen in 
the Central African Republic. R2P was not explicitly invoked for intervention in the 
CAR but implicitly implemented at least at the level of the two first pillars (react and 
prevent). This demonstrates how well it may have integrated international thinking and 
the duty to protect civilians. The wide acceptance of R2P may provide the plausible 
explanation as to why the “forgotten” country of the CAR might have received help. 
Without foreign intervention, the CAR would not be where it is today; deaths would 
have continued to increase whether they be direct or indirect consequences of conflict, 
refugees would not have had access to humanitarian aid, many would not be able to 
leave or return to their homes and documentation of the conflict and development in the 
area would have been close to impossible.  
Genocide was averted in the CAR but only for the short run. The crisis in the 
CAR is no longer a violent conflict crisis but has become a large scale humanitarian 
one. Many more factors need to be taken into consideration in the genocide prevention 
framework. This study does not advocate for more measure stop genocide but highlights 
the possibilities of enlarging the genocide prevention framework but reinforcing the 
third and last pillar of R2P: rebuild. The international community has proved itself to be 
capable of reacting fast and stabilizing conflict but it is still responsible for the last step 
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of fostering peace and security. The key is to look at genocide from a different angle 
and to implement measures with more awareness to the culture and economics 
surrounding violence.  
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Recommendations: Shifting to a larger framework of genocide 
prevention using innovation and investment 
Genocide prevention tools have progressed significantly since the coining of the 
term “genocide” and in particular after the genocides of the 90s. The intervention in the 
CAR proves that the effective implementation of these tools is possible and provides 
hope for the future. However, as the conflict is ongoing, the situation reveals the 
weakness of genocide prevention today. 
 Genocide prevention frameworks need to actively be mindful of the economic, 
historical, cultural and political layers of conflict in order to effectively put to use the 
mechanisms and tools created in the past. One way of doing so is by enlarging the pool 
of decision-makers in genocide prevention. This study has used the term “international 
community” while referring to the international state system. The reality is that we 
should be talking about an international community where civil society organizations 
(CSOs), development aid programs, international financial insitutions, environmental 
movements, researchers and engineers work together. Special adviser Edward Luck in 
his video on the Responsibility to Protect stated that R2P ultimately “[relies] on civil 
society that internalize these values [of responsibility to protect] which ultimately will 
make the most difference.” All individuals must have a stake in it not because it is a 
moral human obligation but because in genocide, humanity is put to question.  
Genocide is total: it permeates all aspects of society beyond that of politics. 
Genocide is creative: it eludes the rational understanding of the use of force and the 
scope of violence. Prevention of genocide should work in similar ways. Genocide 
prevention should be total and it should be creative. If the framework of genocide 
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prevention were limited to the scope provided explicitly in legal and academic 
documents then we would find ourselves perpetually encountering genocide and 
perpetually needing to prevent it without addressing the dynamics inherent to the 
conflict. In Ban Ki-Moon’s “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” report, he 
write that “one of the keys to preventing small crimes from becoming large ones, as 
well as to ending such affronts to human dignity altogether, is to foster individual 
responsibility. Even in the worst genocide, there are ordinary people who refuse to be 
complicit in the collective evil, who display the values, the independence and the will to 
say no to those who would plunge their societies into cauldrons of cruelty, injustice, 
hatred and violence.” (UN, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” 2009) The 
international community needs to create those opportunities for individuals to be 
responsible in genocide prevention.  
It is important to find leaders to make change and “own” the reconstruction of 
society after genocide. Patrick Awuah in his Ted talk explains that it is important to 
educate leaders but that it is even more important to train the elite in general: the 
doctors, lawyers, engineers and journalists. Good leadership matters in a place where 
institutions are weak. By investing in leaders, the international community can foster a 
sense of responsibility rather than a sense of entitlement and it can overcome the 
difficulties that were pointed out earlier on in this study concerning the abstraction of 
cultural and economic implications of genocide.  
The world is changing rapidly and genocide prevention as a process should 
adapt to this momentum. Investment and innovation are key for the future of genocide 
prevention. The use of technology, social media, news reporting and easy 
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communication will revolutionize the distribution of power as well as the nature of 
conflict. In the CAR, the international community could implement better 
communication systems but bettering roads and investing in infrastructure, agriculture 
and the responsible and ethical manufacturing of natural resources. The international 
community must implement systems thinking in which processes of genocide are 
analyzed rather than events or acts of genocide. As the world becomes increasingly 
interconnected, we should keep in mind the words of Patrick Awuah: “the state of the 
world depends on what is happening to Africa.” (Awuah)   
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Further Research 
In this line with thought, further research in genocide studies needs to be 
interdisciplinary in order to approach prevention in a more holistic way. In political 
science, research needs to explore how genocide articulates within the larger context of 
war. Anthropological studies can be made on how genocide creates national identities 
and cultural boundaries. How does a Central African identify? Certainly not according 
to their national identity. What is the determinant then? Historians have often 
overlooked the history of genocide (Schaller) but more academics should highlight the 
linked between violence, colonialism and genocide on the African continent. The 
connection between environmental degradation and resource conflicts will become 
more and more relevant in genocide studies in the coming years. How does this 
phenomenon interact with changing demographics and identities?  
One particular aspect and field of study that is completely omitted in the 
literature of genocide studies is economics. As an economics major myself, I cannot 
emphasize how important economics is in understanding conflict management. 
Economics is the underlying machinery of life today. This science is concerned with the 
process of system by which goods and services are produced, sold and bought. I 
understand economics as the science of decision-making with scarce resources. 
Acemoglu and Robinson in Why Nations Fail use economics to reveal the relationship 
between poverty, history, development and politics. Jared Diamond in Collapse 
explains why societies collapse despite the fact that they seem to be developing 
exponentially. Economics explores strange questions in all different fields without a 
specific goal or direction: why do rational beings do what they do and act the way they 
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do because of the limited means that they have? Economics is an amoral tool and 
framework for genocide studies that has great potential for genocide studies and the 
field of conflict resolution in general. 
It is important to think differently and apply the skills from various fields to 
paint a more holistic portrait of genocide and its implications. Understanding genocide 
in the larger scope of things can help us make sense of this enormity and absurdity.  
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Figure 2: Regional map for the Central African Republic 
 
Figure 3: Conflict division and space distribution in 2014 
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